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ASSESSING THE OPTIONS FOR
DESIGNING A MANDATORY U.S.
GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION
PROGRAM
Robert R. Nordhaus*
Kyle W. Danish**
Abstract: With the United States accounting for over one-ªfth of global
emissions of greenhouse gases, the U.S. government is facing pressures—
from both domestic and international sources—to establish a com-
prehensive mandatory reduction program to address the risk of global
climate change. If Congress decides to move forward with such a program,
it could be creating an environmental regulatory regime of unpre-
cedented scope and impact. Many policymakers are considering inno-
vative market-based approaches to regulation, including a multibillion
dollar economy-wide “cap-and-trade” program. The authors evaluate four
models for a domestic program against a set of several criteria, including
environmental effectiveness, cost, administrative feasibility, distributional
equity, and political acceptability.
Introduction
Until now, U.S. climate change policy at the federal level has con-
sisted of voluntary greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation programs, re-
search and development, and a subset of energy policies that focus on
energy efªciency and renewable energy. However, the U.S. government
is facing pressures—from both domestic and international sources—to
establish a federal mandatory reduction program to address the risk of
global climate change. If Congress decides to move forward with such a
program, it could be creating an environmental regulatory regime of
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unprecedented scope and impact. Sources of greenhouse gases range
from electric power plants to every car on the road. In addition, many
policymakers are considering innovative market-based approaches to
regulation, including a multi-billion dollar economy-wide cap-and-trade
program.
This Article identiªes issues that must be addressed in the design
of a mandatory domestic GHG reduction program. The Article then
evaluates a number of proposals, including (1) comprehensive cap-
and-trade programs; (2) a GHG tax; and (3) a “sectoral hybrid” pro-
gram that combines elements of a cap-and-trade program with prod-
uct efªciency standards for automobiles and consumer products.
While there is a substantial body of opinion, particularly among
economists, that an economy-wide cap-and-trade or GHG tax program
may be optimal from a cost-effectiveness point of view, it is possible that
a GHG regulatory program will be developed from discrete familiar
elements, such as existing Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
and appliance efªciency standards, plus large stationary source controls
modeled on the acid-rain control program. Rather than creating a
whole new system, Congress may choose the latter approach because of
both familiarity and political sensitivity regarding program designs that
result in overt increases in prices for gasoline and home heating fuels.
We review the implications of these two fundamentally different ap-
proaches.
While this Article focuses on options for federal regulatory policies,
it is important to note that a domestic climate change program could
enhance its regulatory policies with a range of non-regulatory measures,
such as funding for research and development into new technologies,
ªnancial and other incentives, public education, and changes in infra-
structure and land-use policies. In addition, state and local governments
may supplement a federal regulatory program with their own policy ini-
tiatives.1
I. U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Proªle
Domestic climate change policy will likely focus on reductions or
sequestration of emissions of six GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO2), meth-
ane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and what have been called the “syn-
                                                                                                                     
1 For more information on current state and local climate change policy initiatives, see
the Pew Center on Global Climate Change’s State and Local Net Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions Reduction Programs database, at http://www.pewclimate.org/states.cfm (last visited
Jan. 14, 2005).
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thetic gases,” hydroºuorocarbons (HFCs), perºuorocarbons (PFCs),
and sulfur hexaºuoride (SF6).2
Because GHGs have long lifetimes in the atmosphere, it matters
little where or exactly when GHG emission reductions are made.3 For
example, one ton emitted in the United States has the same impact as
one ton emitted in Malaysia, and reducing one ton of GHG emissions
now, rather than ªve years from now, will make little difference in at-
mospheric GHG concentrations in 2050.4 This means that an effective
regulatory program can allow ºexibility as to where emission reduc-
tions occur and substantial but not unlimited ºexibility as to when
they occur.
Different GHGs vary as to their residence lives in the atmosphere
and their heat-trapping, or “radiative forcing,” effects.5 Some GHGs
have very long atmospheric lifetimes.6 The Kyoto Protocol adopts a
weighting formula called “Global Warming Potential” (GWP), which
measures the impact of one ton of any GHG with reference to one ton
of CO2.7 With such an agreed-upon “exchange rate,” policymakers can
develop a unitary program objective in terms of “CO2-equivalent”
units, which allows regulated ªrms to pick whatever mix of reductions
of different GHGs they believe is most cost-effective.8
                                                                                                                     
2 See U.S. EPA, Inventory of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2001, at ES-
1 to ES-2 (2003), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKey
Lookup/LHOD5MJQ6G/$File/2003-ªnal-inventory.pdf. HFCs and PFCs are industrial
products that are substitutes for ozone-depleting substances. Id. Ozone-depleting substances
themselves are GHGs, but the United States and other countries are phasing out these
substances pursuant to an international treaty, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
Certain other gases—carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and non-methane
volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs)—are not GHGs but have an indirect effect on
climate change by inºuencing the creation and destruction of tropospheric and
stratospheric ozone. See U.S. EPA, supra, at ES-2. These gases are “criteria pollutants” under
the Clean Air Act (CAA) and therefore are subject to established regulatory regimes. 42
U.S.C. § 7412 (2000). Emissions of another criteria pollutant, sulfur dioxide (SO2), also
indirectly affect climate change by altering the absorptive characteristics of the atmosphere.
See U.S. EPA, supra, at ES-2.
3 See U.S. EPA, supra note 2, at 1-8.
4 See id.
5 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: The
Scientiªc Basis 356 ( J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter IPCC].
6 For example, a ton of PFCs can persist in the atmosphere for 10,000 to 50,000 years.
See id. at 47.
7 Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, GWP and Carbon Dioxide Equivalents (CO2E)
[hereinafter Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change], at http://www.pewclimate.org/
global-warming-basics/facts_and_ªgures/gwp.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
8 See IPCC, supra note 5, at 385–86.
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A. Carbon Dioxide
Carbon dioxide emissions, resulting almost entirely from com-
bustion of fossil fuels, dominate GHG emissions in the United States
and are likely to be among the principal initial targets of any domestic
GHG regulatory program. In 2001, energy-related CO2 emissions ac-
counted for approximately eighty-one percent of U.S. GWP-weighted
emissions.9
Within the energy sector, the principal means of abating CO2
emissions are switching from energy sources with high carbon content
to those with low or zero carbon content, such as renewables; improv-
ing the efªciency of energy conversion or use; reducing energy use;
and developing carbon capture and sequestration technologies.10
Annual U.S. CO2 emissions also are affected by land use, land-use
change, and forestry (LULUCF) activities.11 Plants and certain other
biotic matter remove CO2 from the atmosphere and store or “seques-
ter” it as carbon, at least temporarily, through the process of photosyn-
thesis.12 Hence, forests and agricultural lands are “reservoirs” of carbon
and a range of activities can enhance their sequestration potential.13
Conversely, certain land use changes, such as deforestation, can oxidize
the carbon stored in biotic matter, thereby leading to CO2 emissions.14
B. Other GHGs
Methane is the second-largest contributor to U.S. GHG emis-
sions, constituting 8.7% of total U.S. GWP-weighted emissions in
2001.15 Methane is emitted from landªlls; natural gas and petroleum
production, transportation, and processing; agricultural activities;
coal mining; stationary and mobile combustion; wastewater treat-
ment; and certain industrial processes.16
Nitrous oxide is a GHG with heat-trapping potential that exceeds
that of CO2 by an order of magnitude.17 Emissions of nitrous oxide
made up 6.1% of U.S. GWP-weighted emissions in 2001.18 The pri-
                                                                                                                     
9 See U.S. EPA, supra note 2, at 2-1.
10 See id. at ES-10 to ES-17.
11 Id. at ES-17.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See id.
15 See U.S. EPA, supra note 2, at ES-3 tbl.ES-1, ES-18 ªg.ES-14.
16 Id. at ES-18 to ES-20.
17 Id. at ES-20.
18 Id. at ES-3 tbl.ES-1.
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mary human activities resulting in emissions of nitrous oxide are agri-
cultural soil management, fuel combustion in motor vehicles, and
production processes for adipic and nitric acid.19
Emissions of HFCs and PFCs are primarily associated with their
use as substitutes for ozone depleting substances banned under the
Montreal Protocol treaty.20 Emissions of HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 also re-
sult from certain other industrial processes, including production of
primary aluminum, certain steps in the manufacture of products in
the semiconductor industry, and activities related to the operation of
electrical transmission and distribution equipment.21 These gases have
very powerful heat-trapping effects.22 They constituted 1.6% of U.S.
GWP-weighted emissions in 2001.23
C. U.S. GHG Emission Trends
Eventual stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of GHGs
will require very large reductions in GHG emissions worldwide. Not-
withstanding a slight decline in 2001,24 U.S. emissions are projected to
increase. As discussed above, U.S. emissions were 11.9% higher in
2001 than they were in 1990.25 Between 1990 and 2000, the GHG “in-
tensity” of the U.S. economy—the ratio of total GHG emissions to
economic output—declined by 17.5%.26 In a report submitted to the
United Nations in 2002, the U.S. government projected that by 2020,
U.S. GHG emissions will rise 42.7% from year-2000 levels.27
                                                                                                                     
19 Id. at ES-20 to ES-22.
20 Id. at ES-22; see Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, su-
pra note 2.
21 U.S. EPA, supra note 2, at ES-22.
22 See id.
23 See id. at ES-3 tbl.ES-1.
24 See Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Emissions of Greenhouse Gases
in the United States 2001, at ix (2002), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/
gg02rpt/pdf/057301.pdf. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),
U.S. GHG emissions declined 1.2% in 2001. Id. The EIA attributed this decrease to reduced
economic growth, warmer winter weather, and reduced electricity demand. Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 4.
27 See U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Climate Action Report 2002, at 73 (2002), available
at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/SHSU5BWHU6/
$File/uscar.pdf. This projection did not take into account the effects of the Bush Admini-
stration’s climate policy announced on February 14, 2002. Id. at 78–79.
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II. Domestic Climate Policy Framework
The existing federal framework for addressing climate change in
the United States is a combination of voluntary programs, tax incen-
tives, energy efªciency standards, and research and development. These
programs, and certain Clean Air Act provisions, are described below.
A. Voluntary Programs
Since 1993, the federal government has established a number of
voluntary GHG emission reduction programs to encourage businesses
to undertake GHG mitigation actions. This approach began with the
Clinton Administration’s “Climate Change Action Plan” (CCAP).28
The Bush Administration has adopted a similar voluntary strategy.29 A
key supporting element of both the Clinton and Bush Administra-
tions’ voluntary programs is the Department of Energy’s (DOE) vol-
untary GHG reporting program under § 1605(b) of the Energy Policy
Act of 1992.30 The § 1605(b) program authorizes DOE to develop a
system to document voluntary GHG mitigation actions reported by
ªrms and others participating in various voluntary programs.31 Elec-
                                                                                                                     
28 See William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., The Climate Change Action Plan
1–4 (1993). The Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) included the “Green Lights” pro-
gram, encouraging business to upgrade lighting; the “Natural Gas Star” program, encour-
aging voluntary methane reductions by natural gas producers and distributors; the “Coal-
bed Methane Outreach Program,” encouraging coal mining ªrms to capture and use
methane that otherwise would be vented to the atmosphere; and two programs under
which businesses committed to take actions to mitigate their GHG emissions and to report
those actions in a transparent format. Id. at 12, 17, 22, 23, 24. One program, “Climate
Wise,” established such agreements with individual businesses, nonproªt groups, and state
and local governments. Id. at 17. A second program, “Climate Challenge,” established
agreements with electric utilities. Id. at 22.
29 See George W. Bush, Global Climate Change Policy Book (2002). The Bush
Administration climate policy has included: the National Climate Change Research Initia-
tive; the National Climate Change Technology Initiative, which focuses on geological se-
questration; the FutureGen Initiative, which aims to develop “zero-emissions” coal-ªred
power plants; the FreedomCAR Initiative, which aims to develop and deploy hydrogen
fuel-cell vehicles; the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative, which aims to develop viable fuel cells and
hydrogen infrastructure; and the Climate VISION Program, which aims to establish volun-
tary emission reduction agreements with key sectors of the economy. See id.; George W.
Bush, Climate Change Fact Sheet, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/
09/20030930-4.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
30 See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1605(b), 106 Stat. 2776
(codiªed at 42 U.S.C. § 13,385 (1994)). Rules for the § 1605(b) program are set forth at 59
Fed. Reg. 52,769 (Oct. 19, 1994).
31 See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1605(b).
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tric utilities, in particular, have reported numerous projects under the
§ 1605(b) program.32
While the various voluntary programs have led to a signiªcant
number of emission reduction projects, overall emission levels have
continued to increase.33 Several factors have contributed to the limited
effectiveness of voluntary programs.34 First, while some participants in
these programs have committed to taking particular mitigation actions,
they have not in many cases committed to limiting their company-wide
emissions below a particular baseline; for many, total system emissions
increased substantially in response to increased market demand for
products and services.35 Second, some participants committed to ac-
tions that they might have implemented anyway for business reasons.36
In particular, commentators have asserted that the § 1605(b) program
lacks rigorous reporting standards and veriªcation requirements, and
concerns have been raised that some reductions reported under the
program have been double-counted.37 The Bush Administration has
pledged to address these shortcomings in a planned upgrade to the
program to be completed by the end of 2004.38 However, any voluntary
program remains subject to a fundamental limitation—it only addresses
the emissions of those ªrms that volunteer to participate.39
                                                                                                                     
32 See Energy Info. Admin., Reporting Entities, Data Year 2002, at http://www.eia.doe.
gov/oiaf/1605/TableB1_2002.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
33 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Reported “Reductions,” Rising Emissions, at iii
(2001) [hereinafter NRDC], available at http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/reductions/
reductions.pdf.
34 For a critical review of the rigor and effectiveness of voluntary programs established
under the CCAP, see id.; see also U.S. Gen. Accounting Ofªce, Global Warming: In-
formation on the Results of Four of EPA’s Voluntary Climate Change Programs
(1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/rc97163.pdf.
35 See David Gardiner & Lisa Jacobson, Will Voluntary Programs be Sufªcient to Reduce U.S.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 44 Env’t 24, 27 (2002).
36 See NRDC, supra note 33, at 9.
37 See Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Greenhouse Gas Reporting and Dis-
closure: Key Elements of a Prospective U.S. Program 3 (2002), available at http://
www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/policy_inbrief_ghg.pdf.
38 At the end of 2003, the Department of Energy published proposed revisions to the
§ 1605(b) general guidelines. See 68 Fed. Reg. 68,204 (proposed Dec. 5, 2003) (to be
codiªed at 10 C.F.R. pt. 300). For more information on the Administration’s efforts to
enhance the § 1605(b) requirements, see Ofªce of Policy and Int’l Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of
Energy, Enhancing DOE’s Registry of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Emission Reduc-
tions, at http://www.pi.energy.gov/enhancingGHGregistry/index.html (last visited Jan.
14, 2005). To this end, the Administration is holding a series of workshops. See id.
39 See NRDC, supra note 33; see also Thomas P. Lyon, Res. for the Future, Volun-
tary Versus Mandatory Approaches to Climate Change Mitigation (2003), available
at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-IB-03-01.pdf; Gardiner & Jacobson, supra note 35
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For these reasons, current U.S. voluntary programs—while help-
ful in building awareness, encouraging experimentation, and achiev-
ing some company-level emission reductions—are not expected to
reduce or even stabilize U.S. GHG emissions in the next decade rela-
tive to current levels.40
In addition to the voluntary GHG programs described above, the
U.S. government has established a number of non-regulatory pro-
grams aimed at increasing energy efªciency.41 Because energy-related
GHG emissions make up over eighty percent of total U.S. emissions,
these programs contribute to reducing GHG emissions.42 However,
like the voluntary GHG reduction programs, they do not impose ac-
tual limits on emissions and are incapable of achieving substantial
emission reductions with a high degree of certainty.43
Finally, federal tax law provides a range of tax credits and other
incentives to encourage use of renewable energy and fuel-efªcient ve-
hicles.44 These include: a deduction for a portion of the purchase cost
of a “clean-fuel” vehicle, deªned to include hybrids;45 a credit for the
purchase of an electric vehicle;46 an investment credit for solar or geo-
thermal energy equipment47 and favorable depreciation rates for such
equipment;48 and a credit for production of electricity from wind, cer-
                                                                                                                     
(concluding that voluntary programs are inadequate to signiªcantly reduce short- or long-
term emissions).
40 See Gardiner & Jacobson, supra note 35, at 31–32.
41 Two voluntary energy efªciency programs, “Industries of the Future” and “National
Industrial Competitiveness through Energy, Environment, and Economics” (NICE), estab-
lished public-private partnerships to encourage businesses and state governments to adopt
the best practices and technologies. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Indus. of the Future, at
http://www.eere.energy.gov/industry/program_areas/industries.html (last updated Dec.
29, 2004). Another initiative, the “Energy Star” program, steers consumers to energy
efªcient products by awarding a government “Energy Star” label to such products. See gen-
erally U.S. EPA, Energy Star—The Power to Protect the Environment Through
Energy Efªciency (2003), http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/downloads/energy_
star_report_aug_2003.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). To earn an “Energy Star” label, a
product typically must be in the upper quartile of its product class when it comes to energy
efªciency. See id. For descriptions of other federal energy efªciency programs, see U.S.
Dep’t of Energy, Power Topics, at http://www.eere.energy.gov/EE/power.html (last up-
dated Jan. 11, 2005).
42 See U.S. EPA, supra note 2, at 2-1.
43 See id.
44 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 30, 45, 48, 168 (2000).
45 Id. § 179A.
46 Id. § 30.
47 Id. § 48.
48 Id. § 168.
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tain types of biomass, or poultry waste.49 Congress is considering a
number of additional tax incentives and modiªcations to existing tax
programs in the context of proposed federal energy legislation.50
B. Product Efªciency Standards
1. Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Existing federal law includes two major mandatory energy
efªciency programs: one for automobiles,51 and the other for con-
sumer products other than automobiles.52 Both were established in
1975 under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA).53 The
program for motor vehicles—known as Corporate Average Fuel
Economy or “CAFE”—requires each automobile manufacturer or im-
porter to meet average fuel economy standards for the ºeet of new
vehicles it manufactures or imports in each model year.54 These stan-
dards are expressed in miles per gallon (mpg).55 Separate standards
are set for passenger automobiles and “light-duty trucks”—including
sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and minivans—currently at 27.5 mpg and
20.7 mpg respectively.56
The statute applies only to new vehicles and does not regulate in-
use consumption of fuel.57 More stringent standards improve on-the-
road fuel economy only to the extent that new vehicles replace less
efªcient existing vehicles.58 In addition, for new vehicles, if vehicle
                                                                                                                     
49 Id. §§ 45, 48, 168, 179A.
50 See Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Analysis of Selected Provisions
of Proposed Energy Legislation: 2003 (2003), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/
oiaf/servicerpt/eleg/pdf/sroiaf(2003)04.pdf.
51 49 U.S.C. §§ 32,900–32,901 (2000).
52 42 U.S.C. §§ 6291–6309 (2000).
53 Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975)
(automobile fuel economy standards are codiªed as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 32,901–
32,919).
54 43 U.S.C. § 32,902 (2000).
55 Id.
56 Id. § 32,902(a), (b); 67 Fed. Reg. 16,052 (Apr. 4, 2002) (to be codiªed at 67 C.F.R.
pt. 533). Another federal law inºuencing automobile fuel economy is the “gas guzzler” tax.
See Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 4064 (2000). Under this law, cars achieving less
than 22.5 mpg are subject to a sliding scale of tax charges, ranging from $1000 to $7700.
Id. Light-duty trucks are exempt. Id.
57 26 U.S.C. § 32,901(a)(4).
58 Id. § 4064(b)(1)(B). However, the current program does not provide consumers
with incentives to purchase new, fuel-efªcient vehicles even if they are available and in fact
may retard turnover to the extent it drives up the cost of new vehicles. See id.
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miles traveled (VMT) increase faster than average fuel economy,
overall fuel use will go up notwithstanding the CAFE requirements.59
The statute contains a number of idiosyncratic features that in-
crease its complexity, while decreasing its effectiveness.60 Trucks and
SUVs are subject to far less stringent standards than cars.61 Compliance
with the standard is determined separately for vehicles manufactured
in the United States, Canada, or Mexico, and those vehicles manufac-
tured elsewhere but used in the United States.62 Special credit is given
to electric vehicles and to alternative fuel-capable vehicles.63
While the CAFE program made a signiªcant contribution to
moderating U.S. fuel use in the ªrst years after its enactment, its im-
pact has declined over time for a number of reasons.64 First, the stan-
dards were frozen for many years. Therefore, the standards have not
taken into account the increasing proportions of truck, SUV, and mi-
nivan sales. Starting in 2001, such “light-duty trucks” made up over
ªfty percent of vehicles sold.65 Congress’s decision to freeze the stan-
dards throughout most of the 1990s, combined with the change in
product mix, has had the effect of decreasing the ability of the pro-
gram to moderate fuel use.66 Second, real gasoline prices have de-
clined, encouraging more driving and dampening incentives for driv-
ers to demand more efªcient vehicles. Accordingly, even though fuel
economy for cars has improved since the enactment of CAFE, overall
fuel use—and, therefore, GHG emissions—has risen steadily.67
Of course, policymakers did not design CAFE as a domestic GHG
regulatory program, and to function as one it would need not only to
have the features noted above corrected—removing the freeze on
                                                                                                                     
59 See Transp. Research Bd., Nat’l Research Council, Effectiveness and Impact
of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards 83–85 (Duncan Brown ed.,
2002).
60 See 43 U.S.C. § 32,902.
61 Compare 49 U.S.C. § 32,902(a), with § 32,902(b).
62 See Transp. Research Bd., supra note 59, at 15.
63 49 U.S.C. § 32,905.
64 See Transp. Research Bd., supra note 59, at 14, 15–16.
65 See Michelle Maynard, Bracing for Soft Sales, Carmakers Seek Out Higher Ground, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 11, 2002, at F1. Congress lifted its freeze on CAFE standards in 2001. See The
Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Act of 2001 for FY 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-87, 115 Stat. 833 (2001). The Bush Administration, through the National Highway
Trafªc Safety Administration, has proposed increasing the CAFE standard for light trucks
from its current level of 20.7 mpg to 21.0 mpg for model year 2005, 21.6 mpg for model
year 2006, and 22.2 mpg for model year 2007. See Light Truck Average Fuel Economy
Standards Model Years 2005–07, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,015 (proposed Dec. 16, 2002).
66 See Transp. Research Bd., supra note 59, at 15.
67 See Transp. Research Bd., supra note 59, at 19–20 ªg.2-9.
2005] Designing a Mandatory U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program 107
more stringent standards and modifying the electric vehicle and al-
ternative fuel credits68—but also the mpg standard would have to be
translated into terms of pounds of CO2 per mile to take into account
the carbon content of fuel.69 Additionally, as discussed below, a num-
ber of other changes would be needed to integrate such a program
into a domestic cap-and-trade program for GHGs.
2. Appliance Standards
EPCA also established an energy efªciency program for con-
sumer products other than autos—usually referred to as the “appli-
ance efªciency program.”70 It includes mandatory energy labeling
and energy efªciency standards for a wide range of consumer prod-
ucts, including air conditioners, washers, dryers, kitchen ranges, and
furnaces.71 Standards also cover some equipment used in industrial
applications, such as most industrial motors.72 According to DOE, the
standards program has resulted in a greater than one quad reduction
of energy use annually, equivalent to roughly one percent of energy
use or about seventy-ªve million tons of CO2.73 It aims at requiring for
each type of consumer product the maximum energy efªciency that is
technologically feasible and economically justiªed; but its complex
regulatory framework makes prompt action to promulgate stringent
new standards quite difªcult.74
                                                                                                                     
68 The electric vehicle credit does not take into account GHG emissions associated
with electric generation. 26 U.S.C. § 32,903 (2000). The alternative fuel credit is available
for vehicles that are capable of using alternative fuels, whether or not these fuels are actu-
ally used. Id. § 32,905(b).
69 See Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, supra note 7.
70 See Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, supra note 53 (appliance efªciency
standards are codiªed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6291–6309 (2000)).
71 42 U.S.C. § 6292.
72 Id. For more information on existing energy efªciency standards for commercial
and industrial equipment, see U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Building Technologies Program: Ap-
pliances & Commercial Equipment Standards, at http://www.eren.doe.gov/buildings/
appliance_standards/ (last updated Jan. 5, 2005).
73 Toru Kubo et al., Am. Council for an Energy-Efªcient Econ., Opportunities
for New Appliance and Equipment Efªciency Standards 5, 6 (2001), available at
http://www.aceee.org/energy/A016full.pdf; Telephone Interview with Michael McCabe,
Acting Program Manager, Ofªce of Building Technologies, Ofªce of Energy Efªciency and
Renewable Technology, U.S. Department of Energy (Apr. 4, 2003).
74 In the case of electric appliances, CO2 emissions are from the electric generator
rather than from the appliance, as in the case of gas appliances. See Kubo et al., supra
note 73, at 8. As with CAFE, the efªciency standards are expressed in terms of energy use,
not GHG emissions. See id. Also, efªciency standards on appliances are currently not com-
parable across energy types. See id. at 5–6. Thus for example, a highly efªcient electric wa-
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While the standards program in its present form could be used
for GHG regulatory purposes, it would be better adapted to that pur-
pose if the standards were expressed in the form of direct or indirect
GHG emissions per unit of output, and if a trading feature could link
it to GHG regulation in other sectors.75
C. Clean Air Act
Aside from a requirement that electricity generators, who ac-
count for about one-third of U.S. GHG emissions, monitor and report
their CO2 emissions, the Clean Air Act (CAA)76 does not directly ad-
dress control of GHG emissions, much less explicitly authorize GHG
regulation. The question of whether EPA has implied authority under
the CAA to regulate GHGs—by virtue of its CAA authority to regulate
“air pollutants”—is the subject of vigorous debate.77
This debate is beyond the scope of this Article, which contem-
plates action by Congress to establish a GHG regulatory program by
statute, rather than action by EPA using its existing CAA authorities.
Nevertheless, it is worth observing that the acid rain provisions of the
CAA present a useful model for a cap-and-trade program applicable
to CO2 emissions from electricity generators—which is one of the
models for GHG regulation considered below.78 The acid rain pro-
gram imposes a national limit on SO2 emissions from electricity gen-
erators—currently set at 8.9 million tons per year—allocates allow-
                                                                                                                     
ter heater produces much more CO2 emissions than a gas water heater of fairly low
efªciency because the efªciency of fuel to electric conversion is so low. See id. For the ap-
pliance standard program to work in the GHG context, the standards should reºect re-
vised direct and indirect CO2 emissions. See generally Kubo et al., supra note 73, at 7–15.
75 See Cong. Budget Ofªce, Who Gains and Who Pays Under Carbon-Allowance
Trading? The Distributional Effects of Alternative Policy Designs 4–5 (2000).
76 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000).
77 In response to a petition for rulemaking, EPA published a decision stating it lacks
authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate GHGs to address climate change. See Control
of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines: Notice of Denial, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003). A number of state attorneys general and environmental groups
have ªled a petition for review of this Notice of Denial in the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. See Petitioners’ Brief, Massachusetts v. U.S. EPA, No. 03-1361
(D.C. Cir. 2005 ªled Oct. 23, 2003). The Petitioners ªled their opening brief in the case on
June 22, 2004. See id.
78 The acid rain program is set forth in Title IV of the CAA and related regulations. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651(o). For an examination of the acid rain program, other trading
programs, and the lessons those programs may hold for GHG emissions trading, see A.
Denny Ellerman et al., Pew Ctr. for Global Climate Change, Emissions Trading in
the U.S.: Experience, Lessons, and Considerations for Greenhouse Gases (May
2003), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/emissions_trading.pdf.
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ances to existing sources to emit speciªed quantities of SO2, and al-
lows sources to trade and bank allowances, so that they can pursue
least-cost compliance strategies.79
D. Options for a Domestic Program to Secure Greenhouse Gas Reductions
While voluntary programs, the CAFE program, tax incentives,
and product efªciency standards have contributed to reductions in
GHGs that would not otherwise have occurred, they neither individu-
ally nor collectively are likely to achieve signiªcant economy-wide re-
ductions in GHG emissions from current levels.80 Substantial atten-
tion has been given to formulating and evaluating a range of
alternative mechanisms for controlling U.S. GHG emissions.81 For ex-
ample, several bills have been introduced that would establish a CO2
cap-and-trade program for electric utilities, modeled on the SO2 pro-
gram under Title IV of the CAA.82 In January 2003, Senators John
McCain (R-AZ) and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) introduced legislation
that would establish an economy-wide GHG cap-and-trade program.83
In March 2004, a companion version of the McCain-Lieberman bill
was introduced in the House.84
The principal options for a mandatory GHG reduction program,
and the ones evaluated below, are:
Cap-and-Trade: A comprehensive cap-and-trade program, similar in
many respects to the acid rain program, that allocates or auctions a
ªxed number of tradable allowances to emitters and requires them to
surrender allowances equal to their emissions in a particular compli-
                                                                                                                     
79 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651(o).
80 See Douglas W. Smith et al., Pew Ctr. for Global Climate Change, Designing
a Climate-Friendly Energy Policy: Options for the Near-Term, at v (2002) (suggest-
ing that even implementation of a “climate-friendly energy polic[y]” would not be ade-
quate to reduce U.S. GHG emission levels to year-1990 levels), available at http://
www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/energy.policy.pdf.
81 See generally The H. John Heinz III Ctr. for Science, Econ. & the Env’t, Designs
for Domestic Carbon Emissions Trading (1998) [hereinafter Heinz Ctr.], available at
http://www.heinzctr.org/NEW_WEB/PDF/gc_emissions_trading.pdf.
82 These bills are: the Clean Smokestacks Act of 2003, H.R. 2042, 108th Cong. (2003);
the Clean Air Planning Act of 2003, S. 843, 108th Cong. (2003); and the Clean Power Act
of 2003, S. 366, 108th Cong. (2003).
83 See Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003) (commonly known
as the McCain-Lieberman bill). In October 2003, the McCain-Lieberman bill was defeated
43–55 in the U.S. Senate. Senators McCain and Lieberman have pledged to reintroduce
the bill. See id., 149 Cong. Rec. S.13,572 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 2003).
84 See Climate Stewardship Act of 2004, H.R. 4067, 108th Cong. (2004).
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ance period—known as “downstream” cap-and-trade.85 A variant of this
program requires ªrms to surrender allowances equal to the carbon
content of the fuel and the GHG content of certain other products they
sell each year—known as “upstream” cap-and-trade.86
GHG tax: A tax either on GHG emissions or on the carbon con-
tent of fuel and the GHG content of certain other products.87
Sectoral Hybrid: A program that combines a large-source cap-and-
trade program with product efªciency standards, that is, standards for
consumer products and equipment that prescribe emissions per unit
of output—pounds of CO2 per mile, for example—or energy
efªciency levels.88
This Article also discusses in general terms additional options
such as stationary source emission standards, stand-alone product
efªciency standards, and a stand-alone large-source cap-and-trade
program.
III. Design Criteria for a Domestic GHG Regulatory Program
Evaluating different GHG regulatory program options involves a
number of considerations. The ªrst design decision is establishing the
program’s emissions reduction objective. Once an emissions reduction
objective is set, policymakers have to design a regulatory program to
meet it. Key design criteria include environmental effectiveness, cost,
administrative feasibility, distributional equity, and political acceptabil-
ity. The sections that follow elaborate on each of these criteria.
The emissions reduction target for a domestic program establishes
the level and timing of reductions at the national level. The target can
be set for purposes of compliance with an international obligation or
could be established as a matter of domestic policy, independent of any
international obligations. Moreover, it could take the form of a cap on
domestic GHG emissions or a limit on GHG emissions per unit of out-
put, also referred to as an “emissions intensity” target. It could establish
a GHG reduction target for an initial compliance period, or it could
establish a long-term emissions reduction path, phasing in progressively
                                                                                                                     
85 See Cong. Budget Ofªce, An Evaluation of Cap-and-Trade Programs for Re-
ducing U.S. Carbon Emissions (2001).
86 See id.
87 See Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Govern-
ments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. Chi. Legal F. 293, 303.
88 See Tim Hargrave, Ctr. for Clean Air Policy, An Upstream/Downstream Hy-
brid Approach to Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading (2000), available at http://www.
ccap.org/pdf/Hybrid1.PDF.
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more stringent targets over an extended period of time. This Article
does not address the issues of whether or how to set a target, or what
target to set. Instead, it evaluates different designs for a program that
will meet whatever target is decided upon.89
The criteria for evaluating design options are described below.
A. Environmental Effectiveness: How Effective Is the Program
in Meeting Its Emissions Reduction Target?
A regulatory program’s effectiveness in meeting its target is a
function of a number of factors, including its coverage of sources
throughout the economy, its certainty in meeting a particular emis-
sions target, and its provisions for enforcement.
1. Coverage: Are All Sources and Gases Covered?
A program’s coverage refers to the extent to which it directly or
indirectly regulates sources of GHG emissions throughout the U.S.
economy and applies to the full range of GHGs. Broad coverage is
preferable from an environmental perspective, but may have to be
balanced by considerations of administrative cost. Compared to a
program with full coverage, a program with only partial coverage ei-
ther will reduce emissions less, or will attain the same emission reduc-
tions at much higher cost because it excludes opportunities for inex-
pensive reductions in uncovered sectors or gases. Programs with only
partial coverage also risk “leakage.”90 Leakage occurs when a regula-
tory program encourages shifting of emission-generating activities
from regulated to non-regulated ªrms.91
2. Environmental Certainty: Will the Program Ensure That the
Emissions Reduction Target Will Be Met?
Some program designs provide greater certainty that total emis-
sions from regulated ªrms will not exceed a particular level. For ex-
ample, a “quantity-based” approach, such as a conventional cap-and-
                                                                                                                     
89 For a review of the debate between proponents of aggressive near-term emission re-
duction policies and proponents of “back-loading” deeper emission reductions to future
years, see Michael Toman, Res. for the Future, Moving Ahead with Climate Policy
4 (2000), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-CCIB-26.pdf. The question of
how to design a regulatory program to implement a carbon-intensity target is not ad-
dressed in this Article.
90 Cong. Budget Ofªce, supra note 85, at 6.
91 See id.
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trade program, enforces an overall limit on emissions from the cov-
ered ªrms.92 By contrast, “price-based” approaches, such as emission
taxes or trading programs with a safety valve, do not place a precise
limit on total emissions, but instead impose a particular price or price
limits per ton of emissions.93 While establishing an emissions charge
or tax has the effect of reducing emissions, the approach does not
ensure that emissions will be reduced to a precise level.94 In addition,
as explained below, a standards approach that limits emissions per
unit of output, as opposed to tons per year—often referred to as a
“carbon intensity” approach—will not achieve a particular emissions
reduction target with certainty.95 However, because it is cumulative
rather than annual emissions that are important, taxes or standards
should be able to provide almost equivalent environmental certainty if
there is political will to adjust them over time.
3. Enforcement: Is the Program Enforceable?
Any regulatory program’s overall success in reducing emissions
also is a function of its enforcement mechanisms. Enforcement is, in
turn, a function of clear rules, precise and effective measurement of
emissions, pursuit of violators, and having non-compliance penalties
high enough to exceed any beneªts associated with non-compliance.96
                                                                                                                     
92 As discussed in Part IV.A of this Article, a cap-and-trade program could require ªrms
to surrender allowances for their CO2 emissions (downstream) or it could require ªrms to
surrender allowances for the CO2 emissions imputable to the fuel they sell or produce
(upstream). To simplify matters, this section of the Article refers to programs that limit
“emissions.” However, all the observations here apply with equal force to programs that
limit the carbon content of fuels.
93 See Henry D. Jacoby & A. Denny Ellerman, MIT Joint Program on the Science
and Policy of Global Climate Change, The Safety Valve and Climate Policy 2 (re-
vised ed. July 2002), available at http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC
_Rpt83.pdf. For a discussion on the pros and cons of the safety valve approach, see Part
IV.A.4.
94 See id. at 5.
95 See Ctr. for Clean Air Policy, US Carbon Emissions Trading: Description of
an Upstream Approach 10 (1998), available at http://www.ccap.org/pdf/upstpub.pdf.
96 For a review of compliance enforcement mechanisms, including non-sanctioning
mechanisms, see Eric Dannenmaier & Isaac Cohen, Pew Ctr. on Global Climate
Change, Promoting Meaningful Compliance with Climate Change Commitments
(2000).
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B. Cost-Effectiveness: Will the Program Design Allow
Cost-Effective Compliance?
A key consideration in evaluating a GHG regulatory program is
whether it permits compliance with the program’s target at the least
cost to the U.S. economy—what is referred to as “cost-effective” com-
pliance. The ªrst cost-related issue is the direct cost of complying with
the program. A program designed to meet a particular target mini-
mizes compliance costs to the extent that it maximizes ºexibility to
adopt a least-cost compliance strategy—that is, ºexibility as to what,
where, and when emission reductions are attained. In addition, some
program designs can cap compliance costs, but do so at the risk of miss-
ing the program’s target. Another key cost-related consideration is ad-
ministrative cost. Finally, some program designs raise revenue, which, as
explained below, could be used to offset part of the overall cost of the
program by reducing “distortionary” taxes on capital and labor.
1. Flexibility: Will the Program Provide Flexibility as to How, Where,
and When Emission Reductions Are Attained?
A cost-effective program will provide wide ºexibility to regulated
ªrms in determining how to reduce emissions to meet the program
target (“what” ºexibility), where to reduce them (“where” ºexibility),
and within limits, when to reduce them (“when” ºexibility).97 “What”
ºexibility implies that a ªrm can comply by implementing any of the
full range of GHG mitigation measures, including increasing energy
efªciency; switching fuels; reducing consumption; adopting LULUCF
measures, including agriculture; or taking other action to reduce or
sequester GHGs. Second, it implies that ªrms can comply through re-
ductions in any of the major GHGs. Third, it implies that ªrms that can
achieve low-cost reductions will undertake a greater proportion of
emission reductions than ªrms that achieve reductions at higher costs.
Many different kinds of ªrms and activities generate emissions of dif-
ferent GHGs; their costs of reducing those emissions and the means of
reduction available to them vary widely. A program with maximum
“what” ºexibility has the effect of equating marginal costs of mitigation
across all ªrms subject to the program, thereby generating the lowest-
cost distribution of abatement activities throughout the economy.98
                                                                                                                     
97 See Toman, supra note 89, at 4.
98 See Richard B. Stewart & Philippe Sands, The Legal and Institutional Framework for a
Plurilateral Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, in United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, Greenhouse Gas Market Perspectives: Trade and Invest-
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The other critical beneªt of building “what” ºexibility into the
U.S. climate policy architecture from the beginning is that it spurs
technological innovation. Achieving the long-term aim of stabilizing
atmospheric concentrations will not be possible without the develop-
ment and widespread deployment of a range of next-generation ap-
proaches to climate protection, including new clean energy technolo-
gies. Policy approaches that prescribe the use of particular
technologies, such as design standards, provide little incentive for de-
veloping such next-generation approaches. By contrast, approaches
that specify environmental outcomes or place a price on environmental
damage without prescribing the means of compliance can stimulate the
kind of innovation that ultimately will be needed to achieve deeper
emission reductions over time.
“Where” ºexibility implies that the program will recognize reduc-
tions achieved throughout the world. A domestic GHG program that
is integrated with the emerging international market in GHG emis-
sion reductions almost certainly will have lower compliance costs than
a program that credits only reductions made within the United
States.99 Studies have suggested that opening up a U.S. climate pro-
gram to trading even with just the industrialized countries that are
subject to Kyoto Protocol emission limits could reduce a U.S. pro-
gram’s marginal abatement cost by anywhere between thirteen per-
cent and sixty-eight percent.100 Gains from trade would be far greater
if the U.S. program credited reductions achieved in developing coun-
tries, where low-cost abatement options are in abundant supply.101 For
these reasons, the ultimate cost of a U.S. climate change program will
depend in great measure on the extent to which it provides for inter-
national emissions trading.
“When” ºexibility provides the regulated ªrm with choices as to
the timing of emission reductions. Even before the regulatory pro-
                                                                                                                     
ment Implications of the Climate Change Regime 5–6 (2001), available at http://www.
unctad.org/en/docs/poditctedm9.en.pdf.
99 See Richard Rosenzweig et al., Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, The
Emerging International Greenhouse Gas Market 12 (2002), available at http://www.
pewclimate.org/docUploads/trading.pdf.
100 See Jae Edmonds et al., International Emissions Trading, in Climate Change: Sci-
ence, Strategies, and Solutions 245, 257 tbl.6 (Eileen Claussen ed., 2001). Edmonds
and his colleagues compare the results of ªve different studies that modeled the marginal
abatement costs associated with a program aimed at reducing industrial country GHG
emissions 5.2% from 1990 levels in 2010. See id.
101 See id. at 254. Indeed, a U.S. program that credits reductions achieved in countries
not subject to emission limits will have lower costs even if the cost of reductions in those
countries is the same as in the United States.
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gram becomes binding, policymakers can establish a “credit for early
action” policy to assure ªrms that any pre-program efforts to reduce
emissions will be recognized. Such early reduction efforts would have
the same environmental value as reductions made after the regulatory
program has commenced.102 Policymakers also can set an ultimate
compliance deadline for the regulatory program that gives ªrms
sufªcient lead time to develop cost-effective control strategies and
that allows a market for emission reductions to evolve. Further, in es-
tablishing a program’s emissions target, consideration can be given to
determining compliance on the basis of a multi-year emissions aver-
age, rather than the level of emissions in a single year. A multi-year
approach gives ªrms the ºexibility to manage their emissions over
time and avoids penalizing them for emission changes caused by
difªcult-to-control ºuctuations in business cycles and weather.
Other “when” ºexibility measures include “banking” and “bor-
rowing.”103 Programs can be designed so that ªrms that over-comply
can “bank” emission credits and use them in a subsequent compliance
period or sell them at a later date when prices in the trading market
might be higher. A “borrowing” provision would allow a ªrm to com-
ply with its obligations in one compliance period in part by commit-
ting to even deeper-than-required reductions in the subsequent com-
pliance period. With a limited borrowing provision, a regulatory
program could obtain a greater overall level of emission reductions
from those ªrms that could beneªt from additional time to modify
their operations or invest in new technologies. A multi-year compli-
ance period approach would offer similar temporal ºexibility as a
borrowing provision. A ªrm’s ability to borrow has to be limited,
however, lest it become a means of simply avoiding reductions.
                                                                                                                     
102 But see Robert R. Nordhaus & Stephen C. Fotis, Pew Ctr. on Global Climate
Change, Analysis of Early Action Crediting Proposals 28–29 (1998) (discussing the
policy challenge of developing a “baseline” for the purpose of distinguishing reductions
that would have occurred even in the absence of the program—known as “anyway” tons—
from those that occurred as a result of the program—known as “additional” tons), available
at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/pol_early.pdf.
103 See Ellerman et al., supra note 78, at 5–6.
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2. Cost Predictability: Are Costs of Compliance Reasonably Predictable?
A regulatory program also can be designed so that total compli-
ance costs are capped.104 As discussed above, “price-based” approaches,
such as emission taxes, do not provide assurances that a particular level
of emission reductions will be achieved. On the other hand, such pro-
grams do provide assurances that the costs of compliance will not rise
above a particular per-ton level. This kind of certainty about costs gen-
erally is not possible with a quantity-based program, such as a tradi-
tional cap-and-trade program, where it is implied that the quantitative
limit on emissions will be enforced regardless of compliance costs. To
address the risk of spiraling compliance costs associated with a cap-and-
trade program, some have proposed a “safety valve” mechanism, in
which additional allowances would be made available at a pre-set price
representing the maximum acceptable cost.105
3. Raising Revenue: Will the Program Raise Revenues That Can Be
Used to Offset a Portion of Its Costs?
Some program designs that raise revenue, such as GHG taxes or
allowance auctions, offer an opportunity to offset economic costs of
the program borne by particular sectors through ªnancial assistance
programs or reduce the overall cost of the program through a reduc-
tion in federal taxes.106 Economic analysis indicates that programs
that recycle the revenue to reduce distortionary taxes on capital, la-
bor, or income have signiªcant potential to reduce overall costs of a
GHG regulatory program to the economy.107 However, it may prove
politically difªcult to implement tax cuts that increase economic
efªciency. The revenues raised could just as easily be spent on activi-
ties that reduce or have no impact on economic efªciency as on activi-
ties that improve it.
4. Long-Term Incentives: Will the Program Induce Key Sectors to
Begin Investing in Low-Emission Technologies and Practices?
Most climate change analysts agree that moderating the increase
in atmospheric concentrations of GHGs ultimately will require a sub-
                                                                                                                     
104 See William Pizer, Res. for the Future, Choosing Price or Quantity Con-
trols for Greenhouse Gases 2 (1999), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/
RFF-CCIB-17.pdf.
105 See Jacoby & Ellerman, supra note 93, at 4.
106 See Stavins, supra note 87, at 301–07.
107 See id. at 305.
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stantial transformation in the way that industrialized countries like the
United States produce and use energy.108 Near-term policy choices will
have a major impact on the cost of such a long-term effort. The reason
is that energy-producing and energy-using technologies involve long-
term capital investments that are not readily converted to other uses.
Therefore, a domestic program needs to send a credible long-term sig-
nal to key sectors of the economy that encourages a shift toward lower-
carbon technologies and lower-emitting practices. A domestic program
that leaves certain sectors uncovered could result in those sectors “lock-
ing in” higher-emitting technologies and practices, potentially increas-
ing the cost of achieving more substantial economy-wide GHG reduc-
tions in the future.109
C. Administrative Feasibility: Can the Program Be Administered and Does It
Minimize Administrative and Transaction Costs?
A key consideration in designing any regulatory program is
whether it is feasible to administer. A program that is infeasible to ad-
minister will be both environmentally ineffective and economically
inefªcient. One key feasibility consideration is minimizing administra-
tive costs—including the costs of designing the program and the costs
of implementing it, both for the regulated ªrm, which must bear re-
porting or other costs, and for the regulator. Administrative costs are a
function of the number of regulated ªrms, the availability of needed
data about those ªrms, and the complexity of the regulatory pro-
gram.110 In addition, program designs that build upon existing and fa-
miliar programs will impose smaller implementation costs and less
difªculty for the regulator and the ªrms to be regulated than programs
that represent a new departure. Finally, in designing market-based
regulatory programs, careful attention needs to be given to avoiding
unnecessary program complexities and uncertainties that run up par-
ticipants’ transaction costs.111
                                                                                                                     
108 See, e.g, Battelle Global Energy Tech. Strategy Program, Global Energy
Technology Strategy: Addressing Climate Change (2000), available at http://www.
pnl.gov/gtsp/docs/inªnd/cover.pdf.
109 See Robert J. Lempert et al., Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Capital
Cycles and the Timing of Climate Change Policy 42 (2002) (discussing the impor-
tance of capital investment cycles in determining the timing and stringency of climate
change policies), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/capital_cycles.pdf.
110 See Ctr. for Clean Air Policy, supra note 95, at 2.
111 Programs that involve substantial redistribution of income or wealth—for example,
auction or tax type programs—can trigger substantial lobbying and litigation expendi-
tures. See Stavins, supra note 87, at 295–96.
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Another particularly important administrative criterion for a cli-
mate change policy is adaptability, given the necessary duration of any
effort to stabilize concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere. A U.S.
climate change policy framework needs to be able to evolve over time
to accommodate adjustments in the emission reduction commitments
as new information becomes available and as the U.S. economy
changes. In addition, because stabilization of GHG concentrations
ultimately will require global efforts, the policy framework will have to
be ºexible enough to provide for coordination with other countries.
D. Distributional Equity: Is the Burden of Compliance
with the Program Fairly Apportioned?
Another consideration in designing a regulatory program is how
its costs are distributed across society.112 Even the most cost-effective
program design may be unacceptable if its costs are distributed in
such a way that is perceived to be unfair.
All other things being equal, a regulatory program that aims to
reduce GHG emissions will tend to impose its largest costs on ªrms
and households that produce fossil fuels or are heavily dependent on
them.113 A GHG regulatory program also will tend to be relatively
more costly for low-income individuals because they spend a greater
proportion of their total income on energy.114
Some regulatory programs provide opportunities for modifying
these distributional impacts. For example, in an emissions trading
program, the government could allocate allowances on a cost-free ba-
sis to ªrms that would bear the brunt of regulatory compliance costs.
Alternatively, the government could auction allowances and use the
revenue to compensate those particularly burdened by the regulatory
program through targeted tax breaks or lump-sum payments. Emis-
sion tax programs hold similar revenue recycling potential.
E. Political Acceptability: Are There Elements of Program Design
that Affect Its Political Acceptability?
Program designs that promise relatively greater environmental
effectiveness, lower costs, and a more equitable distribution of regula-
tory burdens will be more likely to obtain political support than other
                                                                                                                     
112 See Cong. Budget Ofªce, supra note 75, at 9–11.
113 See id. at 19.
114 See id. at 20.
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designs. However, the U.S. experience with environmental and energy
policy suggests that other factors also affect a program’s political ac-
ceptability. Indeed, considerations of political acceptability may lead
policymakers away from what could otherwise be an optimal program
design with respect to environmental effectiveness, cost, and equity.115
For example, twenty-ªve years of environmental and energy policy
experience suggests that it is difªcult to gain public support for a pro-
gram that relies principally on direct increases in the price of energy—
either through taxes or regulatory measures—even where such a pro-
gram arguably is more cost-effective or will result in a more equitable
distribution of regulatory burdens than other approaches.116 Even in
times of most compelling national circumstances, such as the 1973
Arab oil embargo, Congress was unwilling to use energy price increases
to rein in consumer demand.117 On the other hand, program designs
involving emissions trading or emission charges offer the opportunity
to develop what may be a politically attractive policy package—using
the revenue raised from regulation of GHG emissions as a basis for re-
ducing taxes on income.118
                                                                                                                     
115 See Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental
Policy, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 313, 320–21 (1998).
116 The initial U.S. reaction to the Arab oil embargo of 1973–74 was to impose price
controls on petroleum rather than to allow prices to rise to world market levels. See gener-
ally J. Yost Conner, Jr., Note, Revisiting CAFE: Market Incentives to Greater Automobile Efªciency,
16 Va. Envtl. L.J. 429 (1997) (discussing the Arab oil embargo and EPCA). The Ford
Administration in 1975 submitted legislative proposals to reduce vulnerability to OPEC
action through a mix of pricing policies (decontrol of oil and natural gas prices), encour-
agement of U.S. fossil-fuel production, establishment of a strategic petroleum reserve
(SPR) and energy labeling of, but not standards for, efªciency of consumer products. See
generally Julia Richardson & Robert Nordhaus, The National Energy Act of 1978, 10 Nat. Re-
sources & Env’t 62 (Summer 1995). The Congress responded by enacting the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act, which mandated efªciency standards for automobiles and
appliances and established the SPR, but which maintained price controls on oil and natu-
ral gas. See id. In the late 1970s, the Carter Administration was faced with severe interstate
natural gas shortages and continuing vulnerability of the U.S. to oil supply interruptions.
See id. The Administration proposed to increase gasoline taxes, impose new taxes on crude
oil, natural gas, and petroleum products, strengthen energy efªciency standards, and ulti-
mately to remove price controls on new natural gas. See id. Congress balked at the energy
taxes, but enacted most of the Carter regulatory programs. See id. Clinton’s BTU tax of
1993 suffered a fate similar to the Carter tax proposals—it died.
117 See Conner, supra note 116, at 431.
118 See Anne E. Smith & Martin T. Ross, Ctr. for Clean Air Policy, Allowance Al-
location: Who Wins and Loses Under a Carbon Dioxide Control Program? 10 (2002),
available at http://www.ccap.org/pdf/ccap_cra_report.pdf.
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IV. Evaluating Different Approaches to Regulating
Domestic GHG Emissions
Using the criteria developed above, we evaluate three principal
approaches to regulating domestic GHG emissions: (1) an emissions
trading—or cap-and-trade—program; (2) a GHG tax program; or (3)
a sectoral hybrid program combining a large-source cap-and-trade
program with product efªciency standards. Each approach presents
its own design choices, For example, a cap-and-trade program could
be upstream or downstream.
A. Emission Trading (Cap-and-Trade) Programs
1. Overview of Emission Trading Programs
A conventional cap-and-trade program establishes an economy-
wide or sectoral “cap” on emissions in terms of tons per year or other
compliance period, and allocates or auctions tradable allowances, such
as the right to emit one ton of GHGs, to GHG emission sources or to
fuel suppliers.119 The total number of allowances is equal to the cap. A
downstream cap-and-trade program applies to sources of GHG emis-
sions and requires them to surrender allowances equal to their emis-
sions.120 An upstream program applies to fuel suppliers and requires
them to surrender allowances equivalent to the carbon content of fossil
fuels they supply.121 Cap-and-trade programs are best suited to regula-
tion of emission sources that can be readily measured and monitored.
In the GHG context, such sources include almost all sources of CO2
emissions from fossil-fuel combustion as well as many sources of other
GHG emissions.122 Other types of sources can be regulated on an “opt
in” or project basis, or through supplemental regulation.123 The trading
feature of a cap-and-trade program authorizes regulated ªrms—and
anyone else—to buy, sell, or hold allowances.
In a well-functioning emissions trading market, allowances will
end up distributed among ªrms that need them in a way that mini-
mizes the cost of reducing emissions. For example, in a conventional
downstream cap-and-trade program, ªrms subject to the program buy
                                                                                                                     
119 See Cong. Budget Ofªce, supra note 85, at viii.
120 See id. at 5–6.
121 See id.
122 See generally Ctr. for Clean Air Policy, supra note 95, at 1–3.
123 See Box 1, supra Part IV.A.
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allowances if their costs of reducing emissions—referred to as their
costs of “abatement”—exceed the allowance price.124 Firms sell allow-
ances if their abatement costs are lower than the allowance price.125
Trades continue in this way until ªrms are indifferent between buying
and selling allowances—or, in other words, between abating one more
ton of CO2 or emitting an additional ton.126 At this point, the program
has equalized marginal abatement costs across the economy, and, in
theory, the ªnal distribution of allowances and abatement throughout
the economy reºects the least-cost outcome.127
A GHG emissions trading program could incorporate all forms of
“what,” “where,” and “when” ºexibility, discussed above. Each ªrm
affected by a GHG emissions trading program could reduce its need
for allowances or exposure to higher energy costs by adopting its low-
est-cost means of abatement. Firms also would have an incentive to
develop new technologies or practices to reduce emissions or increase
their energy efªciency. A U.S. domestic cap-and-trade program also
could be integrated with emerging cap-and-trade programs in other
countries and, if the parties so provided, with an international regime
such as the Kyoto Protocol.128
A cap-and-trade program can be extended beyond energy-related
sources of CO2 emissions by directly regulating: (1) sources of non-
CO2 GHGs and/or (2) LULUCF activities that emit or remove CO2.
Some GHG sources and sinks, however, may not be amenable to regu-
lation through such an approach because their emissions may be too
difªcult to measure for purposes of setting a cap and allocating allow-
ances, or to monitor for purposes of enforcement.
                                                                                                                     
124 See Stavins, supra note 87, at 305.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 Crediting Kyoto instruments—speciªcally, Assigned Amount Units, Emission Re-
duction Units, Certiªed Emission Reductions, and Removal Units—in a U.S. domestic
program appears feasible. In addition, the Protocol does not appear to prohibit countries
from hosting emission reduction projects outside the Kyoto regime. Accordingly, a U.S.
program could have its own project-based crediting mechanism for international projects.
However, there does not appear to be any way that U.S. ªrms could sell U.S. emission re-
duction credits or allowances to Kyoto party countries for use in the Kyoto regime unless
the United States becomes a party to the Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22; see also Dan-
iel Bodansky, Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Linking U.S. and International
Climate Change Strategies (2002) (discussing U.S. ratiªcation of Kyoto Protocol),
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/us_international_strategies.pdf.
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In some cases, these sources and sinks could be incorporated into
the cap-and-trade program on a project-by-project basis, known as “pro-
ject-based crediting.” Under project-based crediting, a ªrm could earn
emission credits by undertaking a climate change mitigation project at
a source or sink not otherwise subject to the cap-and-trade program. To
earn credits, a project would have to meet certain criteria. For example,
the ªrm would have to provide for adequate measurement and moni-
toring and demonstrate that the project achieves reductions or remov-
als beyond a baseline or “business-as-usual” scenario. The ªrm also
would have to establish that the project would not simply shift emitting
activities from the project site to another, unregulated site, an effect
commonly referred to as “leakage.” Credits earned for projects could
be fully fungible with allowances in the emissions trading market. An
example of this kind of project-based crediting mechanism is the Kyoto
Protocol’s “Clean Development Mechanism.”129 From a cost-effective-
ness standpoint, project-based crediting is inferior to a cap-and-trade
approach because it entails higher transaction costs. Project-based cred-
iting, however, may be the only way to incorporate certain difªcult-to-
measure sources into a market-based program.
In addition to these forms of “what” and “where” ºexibility, a GHG
emissions trading program could provide for “when” ºexibility by al-
lowing for banking and borrowing. Firms required to surrender allow-
ances to cover their emissions or the carbon content of fuel supplied
could be authorized to bank surplus allowances for use in a later com-
pliance period. Some form of limited borrowing, using future allow-
ances to cover current emissions, also could be considered. Borrowers
could be required to repay with “interest,” i.e., additional allowances.
Box 1: Multi-Gas Approaches to GHG Regulation
While most proposals for domestic GHG regulatory programs
have focused on addressing CO2 emissions from the energy sector,
research suggests that a multi-gas approach could achieve comparable
results at substantially lower cost.130 Designing a multi-gas program
involves consideration of two factors: (1) determining the relative
                                                                                                                     
129 See Nordhaus & Fotis, supra note 102, at 7–8.
130 For a more extensive discussion of issues and options involved in multi-gas ap-
proaches to climate change policy, see John M. Reilly et al., Pew Ctr. on Global Cli-
mate Change, Multi-Gas Contributors to Global Climate Change (2003), available
at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Multi-Gas.pdf.
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value of reductions of different kinds of gases, and (2) measurement
and monitoring of reductions.131
A multi-gas regulatory program requires a formula that will allow
policymakers to accurately weigh the value of, for example, reducing
a ton of CH4 relative to reducing a ton of CO2. The Global Warming
Potential formula is the “exchange rate” approach most widely used at
this time, but has been criticized for not being the right measure for
determining the optimal trade-offs among gases.132
Another issue for policymakers is the extent to which emissions
from different sources of non-CO2 GHGs can be accurately measured
and monitored. Ease of measurement and monitoring dictates
whether sources could be regulated through a cap-and-trade program
or whether some other policy approach is necessary.
Sources of the synthetic gases—HFCs, PFCs, and SF6—are good
candidates for inclusion in a cap-and-trade program.133 The gases are
produced by a relatively small number of large ªrms, and because the
gases themselves are sold rather than emitted as by-products, these
ªrms already have incentives to monitor them.134 Unlike the industrial
gases, industrial emissions of nitrous oxide are a by-product, and
therefore, not currently measured by most ªrms. However, because
the sources are large and concentrated, ªrms likely could develop
                                                                                                                     
131 The European Commission has determined that the complexities of including
sources of non-CO2 GHGs into a cap-and-trade program are signiªcant enough that it has
decided not to include such sources in at least the ªrst phase (2005–2007) of the Euro-
pean Union cap-and-trade program. See Council Directive 2003/87/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275)
32 [hereinafter Council Directive] (establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission
allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC),
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_275/l_27520031025en
00320046.pdf (Oct. 25, 2003). On the other hand, the U.K. is including all six major GHGs
in its trading program. See Reilly et al., supra note 130, at 21–22.
132 The GWP formula has come under signiªcant criticism from a number of quarters
for not accurately representing the full relative beneªts of reductions in the different
GHGs. See Reilly et al., supra note 130, at 57 (citing several studies). These studies assert
that the GWP formula is ºawed because it compares the different gases solely on the ex-
tent of their radiative forcing—the strength of their effects on the climate system—and
their residence life in the atmosphere up to 100 years. See id. Such an approach omits im-
portant information. For example, it does not take into account climate effects resulting
from the interaction of GHGs, nor does it account for their non-climate environmental
effects. See id. Some studies also cite problems with the GWP formula’s approach to time.
Id. On the one hand, the formula equates effects taking place in 20 years with effects tak-
ing place in 100 years. On the other hand, effects taking place after 100 years are omitted
altogether. Research to address these issues continues.
133 See id. at 1.
134 See id. at 25.
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adequate measurement and monitoring capabilities in order to be
included in a cap-and-trade program.135 For example, in the 1990s,
DuPont implemented voluntary controls on its nitrous oxide emis-
sions and developed measuring and monitoring systems to calculate
the results; it achieved a nearly ªfty percent reduction in its GHG
emissions.136
While not as amenable to regulation through a cap-and-trade
program, a domestic program could address certain sources of meth-
ane through a project-based crediting mechanism. For example, ªrms
could earn credit for achieving reductions in methane from coal
mines and large landªlls through the installation of devices that col-
lect and sell the gas for energy purposes.137
Other cases are more difªcult, such as agricultural sources of
methane and nitrous oxide. These sources are highly diffuse and, for
now, it is difªcult to measure and monitor the effects of any mitiga-
tion activities.138 Policymakers likely will have to rely on regulatory
standards, incentives, or the publication of “best practices” to address
these sources.
Box 2: Integrating Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry
(LULUCF) Activities into a Domestic GHG Regulatory Program
LULUCF activities offer a range of highly cost-effective climate
change mitigation opportunities.139 For example, applying “best man-
agement practices” and new technologies to U.S. croplands poten-
tially could sequester 60 to 200 million metric tons of carbon per
year.140 Slowing deforestation of forests—particularly tropical forests—
could address a source of twenty to twenty-ªve percent of annual
                                                                                                                     
135 See id. at 34.
136 For more information on DuPont’s climate change program, see DuPont, Position
Statements: Global Climate Change, at http://www.dupont.com/corp/news/position/
global_climate.html (last updated Dec. 12, 2002).
137 An Environmental Law Institute study suggests that it would be feasible to include
large landªlls and coal mines in a cap-and-trade program. See Envtl. Law Inst., Imple-
menting an Emissions Cap and Allowance Trading System for Greenhouse Gases:
Lessons Learned from the Acid Rain Program 16–19 (1997).
138 See id. at 20, 23.
139 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Land Use, Land-Use Change,
and Forestry § 2.2.1, at 61 (Robert T. Watson et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter IPCC].
140 See Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Agriculture’s Role in Addressing
Climate Change 2, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docuploads/policy_inbrief_
ag.pdf.
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global CO2 emissions.141 To be sure, the capacity of forests to absorb
CO2 emissions is not inªnite, and any forest eventually will start to re-
lease sequestered carbon emissions back to the atmosphere. However,
in the near-term, LULUCF activities have the potential to achieve sub-
stantial mitigation beneªts at relatively low cost, allowing time for the
development and deployment of the next-generation clean energy
technologies that will be needed to achieve deeper cuts in emissions.
LULUCF activities also can offer many side-beneªts, including biodi-
versity protection, improvement of agricultural productivity, and eco-
nomic development for rural communities.
Including any but the very largest domestic landowners in a cap-
and-trade program does not appear to be feasible currently; land
ownership is too diffuse, measuring emission impacts of LULUCF ac-
tivities is too resource-intensive, and the relation between practices
and emissions varies widely depending on a multiplicity of local con-
ditions.142 However, it would be feasible to credit a variety of discrete
domestic and international LULUCF activities through a project-
based crediting mechanism.143
Accommodating LULUCF activities in a project-based mecha-
nism will require attention to deªnitions and rules. As with other
types of climate change mitigation projects, LULUCF projects should
meet criteria for baselines, measurement and monitoring, and leak-
age. At this point in time, some types of LULUCF projects present
relatively greater measurement challenges than projects in the energy
sector.144 LULUCF project criteria also will have to address the risk of
reversibility or “non-permanence.”145 Unlike energy projects, the car-
bon beneªts of some types of LULUCF projects can be reversed if
there is a later natural or human disturbance to the site, such as a for-
est ªre.146 Policymakers will have to develop an approach that ade-
quately accounts for the reversibility risk of LULUCF projects. In de-
veloping a policy approach, policymakers can draw important lessons
from the forestry industry, which has developed over time a range of
                                                                                                                     
141 See IPCC, supra note 139, § 3.5.
142 See Bernhard Schlamadinger & Gregg Marland, Pew Ctr. on Global Climate
Change, Land Use & Global Climate Change 31 (2000), available at http://www.pewcli-
mate.org/docUploads/land_use.pdf.
143 See id. at 39 (discussing projects under the Kyoto Protocol).
144 See id. at 42.
145 See id. at 49.
146 See id. at 31–35 (discussing the issue of permanence).
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sophisticated practices and insurance instruments to protect its in-
vestments in forestry assets.147 A number of approaches have been
proposed to address the reversibility issue, including making project
proponents fully liable for later carbon losses; encouraging project
proponents to obtain insurance; encouraging project proponents to
rely on a pool of forestry projects; discounting of LULUCF credits;
and making LULUCF credits time-limited.148
Certain types of LULUCF activities appear particularly promising,
including cropland and grazing land management; returning crop-
land to grassland or forest cover; conservation of threatened interna-
tional forests; dedication of existing private domestic forestland to
permanent forest status; and reforesting or replanting with native
species lands that were historically forested but have not been in for-
est for a decade or more.149
2. Designing an Emissions Trading Program
Creating a GHG emissions trading program involves three fun-
damental design decisions that build upon this basic model.150 Poli-
cymakers need to determine which ªrms will be required to hold al-
lowances for compliance, how allowances initially will be allocated,
and whether the program will enforce a strict quantitative emissions
target or adopt a price-based “safety valve” approach—an approach
that provides that permits will not exceed a speciªed cost threshold.
Each design decision has various implications for the trading pro-
gram’s effectiveness, cost, administrative feasibility, distributional con-
sequences, and political acceptability.151
3. Who Is the Regulated Firm?
A key step in designing a GHG emissions trading program is de-
termining who are to be the regulated ªrms—that is, the ªrms that will
be required to hold allowances for compliance purposes.152 As noted
                                                                                                                     
147 See George H. Weyerhauser, Jr., & Robert S. Prolman, Climate Change: A Common
Sense View from the Forest, in U.S. Policy on Climate Change: What Next? ( John A. Riggs
ed., 2002), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/aspeninstitute/ªles/Img/pdf/
WeyerhaeuserEEEClimate.pdf.
148 See generally Schlamadinger & Marland, supra note 142.
149 See generally Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, supra note 140.
150 See Cong. Budget Ofªce, supra note 85, at viii.
151 See id. at 4.
152 See id. at viii.
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above, there are two basic options: a downstream approach and an up-
stream approach.153 A downstream program would require ªrms to
hold allowances to cover their GHG emissions.154 An upstream ap-
proach, by contrast, would limit emissions by requiring fuel suppliers to
hold allowances for the carbon content of fuel they sell to downstream
emitters.155 A limit on the carbon content of fuel equates to a limit on
CO2 emissions because, with a few minor exceptions, all of the carbon
in fuel sold downstream is fully combusted as CO2.156 Programs that
combine downstream and upstream approaches also are possible.
a. Downstream Cap-and-Trade
A downstream program has the political and administrative ad-
vantages of familiarity. The CAA acid rain provisions for electricity
generators is widely regarded as a success and could be relatively eas-
ily adapted for GHG trading for those ªrms. A number of extant pro-
posals for a domestic GHG regulatory program have focused on the
establishment of a CO2 cap-and-trade program covering the electric-
ity-generating sector.157 In addition, the European Council has ap-
                                                                                                                     
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 An upstream program would have to be designed in such a way as to exempt the
few non-fuel uses of fossil fuels. These include asphalt, lubricating oil, and waxes. Ctr. for
Clean Air Policy, supra note 95, at 9.
157 These proposals include four bills introduced in the 108th Congress as well as the
McCain-Lieberman bill. See Clean Smokestack Act of 2003, H.R. 2042, 108th Cong. (2003);
Clean Air Planning Act of 2003, S. 843, 108th Cong. (2003); Clean Power Act of 2003, S.
366, 108th Cong. (2003); Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003). In
addition, the state of New Hampshire has passed legislation establishing a “multi-
emissions” program with CO2 trading for electric power generators in the state. See N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 125-O (2002) (effective July 1, 2002). The Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts has promulgated regulations establishing a similar program. See Emissions Standards
for Power Plants, Mass. Regs. Code tit. 310, § 7.29 (2001). Under the “Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative,” governors of eight states in the Northeast have committed to the
establishment of a cap-and-trade program for CO2 emissions by power plants. Their goal is
to establish such a program by April 2005. See Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About
RGGI, at http://rggi.org/about.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2004). A paper by the Progres-
sive Policy Institute outlines a proposal for a downstream cap-and-trade program, includ-
ing not only electric power generators but also other large industrial sources. See Debra
Knopman & Jonathan Naimon, Progressive Policy Inst., How a Domestic Green-
house Gas Emissions Trading Market Could Work in Practice (2000), available at
http://www.ppionline.org/documents/greenhouse_gas.pdf; Jon A. Naimon & Debra S.
Knopman, Progressive Policy Inst., Reframing the Climate Change Debate (1999),
available at http://www.ppionline.org/ndol/print.cfm?contentid=1348. In a study for the
World Wildlife Fund, the Tellus Institute analyzed and recommended a downstream cap-
and-trade program for the electricity-generating sector with a range of standards and in-
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proved the establishment of a downstream cap-and-trade program for
the member countries of the European Union.158
However, a pure downstream approach to regulating U.S. GHGs
has a fundamental drawback: it could not feasibly be applied on an
economy-wide basis. Sources of CO2, the primary GHG, number in
the hundreds of millions. The sources include not only large facilities,
such as those in the electricity generating sector, but also households
and vehicles. The administrative costs of allowance allocation, moni-
toring, and enforcement for so many sources, especially the small
ones, would likely be prohibitive.
Realistically, a downstream trading program could encompass
only a subset of emission sources, such as electricity generators and
other large stationary sources. While such a large-source downstream
program would not be hindered by the administrative impediments
associated with an economy-wide downstream program, it could
reach, at most, less than half of the nation’s CO2 emissions, primarily
because it would not reach emissions from the transportation and
building sectors.159 In terms of dollars per ton, a limited downstream
program would likely be more costly than a more comprehensive
emissions trading program that met the same reduction target. The
full burden of achieving the emissions objective would fall on electric-
ity generators and large industrial sources. Low-cost abatement op-
                                                                                                                     
centive programs. Alison Bailie et al., Tellus Inst. and Stockholm Env’t Inst.—Bos-
ton Ctr., The American Way to the Kyoto Protocol: An Economic Analysis to Re-
duce Carbon Pollution 12 (2001), available at http://www.tellus.org/energy/pub-
lications/E01-073-3.pdf. Finally, three different coalitions of electric power generators
have proposed various versions of a multi-emissions program with CO2 trading for genera-
tors. See Competing Utility Emissions Plans May Create Congressional Hurdle, Inside EPA, Aug.
17, 2001 (describing proposals of the coalition “Clean Power Group”—consisting of
NiSource, Enron, Calpine, El Paso, and Trigen—and the coalition “Clean Energy
Group”—consisting of Conectiv, Consolidated Edison, Northeast Utilities, PG&E National
Energy Group, and Sempra Energy); New Utility Proposal Advocates Voluntary Carbon Cuts,
Inside EPA, Sept. 7, 2001 (describing proposal of the coalition “Energy for a Clean Air
Future,” which consists of PPL, Reliant, TECO Energy, Transalta, and Wisconsin Energy).
158 See Council Directive, supra note 131, at 34.
159 See Ctr. for Clean Air Policy, U.S. Carbon Emissions Trading: Some Options
that Include Downstream Sources 2–3 (1998) [hereinafter CCAP, Options], available
at http://www.ccap.org/pdf/wwwdown.pdf. The Center for Clean Air Policy also has ex-
amined options for extending the coverage of a downstream trading program to at least
some portion of transportation sector emissions by requiring automakers to surrender
allowances for emissions imputed to new vehicles they sell or for all vehicles on the road.
See id. at 30–37; see also Steve Winkelman et al., Ctr. for Clean Air Policy, Transpor-
tation and Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading 12–13 (2000), available at
http://www.ccap.org/pdf/TGHG.pdf.
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portunities in other sectors could be lost.160 In addition, a limited
downstream program could lead to leakage—that is, ªrms would have
incentives to shift production from regulated to exempt facilities.161
For example, if the program applied only to industrial sources above a
certain size, output—and therefore emissions—might shift to sources
below the size cutoff. Finally, opting for a large-source downstream
cap-and-trade program instead of a program with economy-wide cov-
erage would raise the long-term cost of achieving more substantial
emission reductions because the sectors left unregulated would lack
incentives to begin investing in low-carbon technologies, and instead
might lock in higher-emitting technologies and practices.
A downstream cap-and-trade program that focused on electricity
generators and large industrial sources still could be designed to
achieve substantial emission reductions. The electricity-generating
sector accounts for approximately forty percent of the U.S. CO2 emis-
sions and ten percent of world emissions.162 The choice to start with a
limited downstream program would not necessarily preclude moving
to a more comprehensive upstream program later. The second stage
of the program could be an upstream program for other sectors of
the economy. In the alternative, policymakers could shift the point of
regulation from electricity generators to upstream fuel suppliers, in
which case, the former could sell any of their banked allowances to
the latter. However, such a transition may be difªcult because pro-
gram participants may develop vested interests in the persistence of
the program in a particular form.
b. Upstream Cap-and-Trade
While a realistic downstream emissions trading program could
reach at most about ªfty percent of U.S. emissions, it would be feasi-
ble to address virtually all sources of U.S. CO2 emissions through an
upstream emissions trading program.163 The Center for Clean Air Pol-
                                                                                                                     
160 Some abatement opportunities in uncapped sectors could be made available
through project-based crediting, but, as discussed above, project-based crediting entails
higher transaction costs than a cap-and-trade approach. See Envtl. Law Inst., supra note
137, at 12–13.
161 See Cong. Budget Ofªce, supra note 85, at 6; CCAP, Options, supra note 159, at
14.
162 See id. at 7 tbl.1.
163 See Ctr. for Clean Air Policy, supra note 95, at 5. Policymakers also might be able
to address some portion of emissions of the industrial GHGs through upstream controls
on ªrms that manufacture the gases or on ªrms that use the gases in products. This Article
generally will discuss the upstream approach in the context of CO2 regulation.
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icy has found that an upstream program involving fewer than 2000
regulated facilities—approximately the same number of regulated
facilities that are subject to the CAA acid rain program—could reach
virtually all of the CO2 emissions in the U.S. economy.164 These 2000
facilities would include a combination of petroleum reªneries, oil im-
porters, natural gas pipelines, natural gas processing plants, coal
preparation plants, and certain coal mines where the production by-
passes preparation plants. Fuel data is generally available for these
ªrms, thereby easing the reporting burden on the ªrms and the
monitoring and enforcement burden on the government.165 Like a
downstream system, an upstream emissions trading program would
give downstream energy users the incentives and the ºexibility to im-
plement the most cost-effective means of reducing their emissions.166
                                                                                                                     
164 Id. at 6–7. Climate Policy Center (formerly known as Americans for Equitable Solu-
tions), with support from Resources for the Future, has proposed an upstream cap-and-
trade program, called the “Sky Trust.” See Climate Policy Ctr., The Sky Trust Proposal
to Reduce U.S. Carbon Emissions (2000), available at http://www.cpc-inc.org/li-
brary/ªles/10_skytrustno.pdf; Richard D. Morgenstern, Reducing Carbon Emissions and
Limiting Costs, in U.S. Policy on Climate Change, supra note 147, at 166. In its evaluation
of four options for a U.S. GHG cap-and-trade program, the Congressional Budget Ofªce
found that, of the four models it reviewed, the Sky Trust model had the highest overall
score under the study’s criteria of: (1) ease of implementation; (2) carbon target certainty;
(3) incremental cost certainty; (4) cost-effectiveness; and (5) equitable cost distribution.
See Cong. Budget Ofªce, supra note 85, at 18 tbl.2. The proposal also has received favor-
able notices in The Economist and The New Republic. See A Novel Approach to Tackling Climate
Change Could Satisfy Economists and Environmentalists Alike, Economist, Feb. 14, 2002, at 49;
Gregg Easterbrook, Climate Change—How W. Can Save Himself on Global Warming, New Re-
public, July 23, 2001, at 22.
165 Under the S. 366 scheme, the government would allocate allowances annually to
achieve six policy aims: (1) relief for electricity consumers; (2) transition assistance for
dislocated workers and communities negatively impacted by the legislation; (3) encour-
agement of renewable power, energy efªciency, and cleaner energy sources; (5) transition
assistance for electricity generating facilities; and (6) encouragement of biological and
geological carbon sequestration projects.
166 At least two further design questions arise with an upstream program: (1) How can
the program reward facilities that “capture” CO2 emissions at the stack? and (2) Would an
upstream program concentrate power over the allowance market in the hands of a few
large ªrms? With regard to carbon capture, the question arises because an upstream pro-
gram would regulate carbon at the fuel level rather than at the emissions level. For this
reason, sources would not have an incentive to implement carbon capture because it
would not lower the price they pay for fossil fuels. However, it would be possible to design
an upstream cap-and-trade program such that downstream ªrms could earn project-based
emission credits for carbon capture activities and sell those credits to upstream ªrms. This
would introduce carbon capture activities into the program in much the same way that
land-use activities might be introduced into either an upstream or downstream program.
With regard to the market power issue, the question arises because the petroleum industry
currently is dominated by a small number of very large ªrms. The concern is that, under
an upstream program, one or more of these ªrms would receive the bulk of the allowances
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However, the incentive would take a different form. Instead of facing
limits on their emissions, downstream sources would face limits on the
physical availability of carbon-based fuels, which, in turn, would be
reºected in fuel price increases. Theoretically, downstream ªrms and
consumers should respond to this price signal in the same way as they
would to a requirement to hold allowances directly—that is, under an
upstream emissions trading program, the cap on fuel carbon would
induce downstream sources to adopt the least-cost mix of emission
reduction measures. Whether in practice the impacts on fuel use,
technical innovation, and efªciency will be the same is not possible to
predict. However, because an upstream emissions trading program
feasibly, though indirectly, would reach all sources of CO2 emissions,
such a program arguably could achieve any given emissions reduction
objective at less cost than a large-source downstream program.
Some commentators argue that an optimal domestic program
would combine an upstream cap-and-trade program with enhanced
product standards.167 Their rationale is that, from a societal view, con-
sumers often do not respond efªciently to changes in the price of en-
ergy.168 For example, studies suggest that drivers do not take into ac-
count fuel costs savings over the entire useful life of a vehicle in
deciding what level of fuel economy they want from a new vehicle.169
                                                                                                                     
and thereby have the power to control prices by witholding its allowances from the market.
Such an outcome is highly unlikely for at least three reasons. First, the shape of the market
is determined not by the ªrms regulated under the policy, but by the allocation of allow-
ances. As discussed below, if policymakers opted for an upstream cap-and-trade program
and decided to distribute allowances with the aim of minimizing the impacts of the pro-
gram, they likely would distribute most if not all of the allowances to downstream energy
users, who would be paying higher fuel prices as a result of the upstream cap. Alternatively,
if policymakers opted to auction the allowances, petroleum industry titans would not have
any particular advantage over any other bidder, for example, ªrms from other industries
and investment banks. Second, even if allowances were distributed solely to the regulated
upstream ªrms, it is unlikely that one or more of the major oil ªrms would receive enough
allowances to exercise market power. The use of petroleum products accounts for less than
half of the total emissions associated with the combustion of fossil fuels. Therefore, under
such an allocation scenario, even the dominant petroleum ªrms would receive a relatively
small share of the total allowances. Finally, policymakers could mitigate any potential for
market power by providing for international emission trading, credits for reductions in
non-CO2 gases, and credit for reductions from unregulated sources. These “what”
ºexibility measures would expand the market and thereby diminish the ability of any indi-
vidual ªrm or ªrms to exercise market power.
167 See Ctr. for Clean Air Policy, supra note 95, at 28.
168 See Kubo et al., supra note 73, at 78.
169 See Cong. Budget Ofªce, Reducing Gasoline Consumption: Three Policy Op-
tions 16 box 2 (2002), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/39xx/doc3991/
11-21-GasolineStudy.pdf; David L. Greene & Andreas Schafer, Pew Ctr. on Global
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This potential failure of some end-users to respond efªciently to a price
signal does not affect the environmental effectiveness of an upstream
cap-and-trade program because such a program imposes an absolute
cap on the carbon content of fuel used in the economy. On the other
hand, if consumers do not respond efªciently to the price signal, a dis-
proportionate share of the burden of meeting an emissions cap could
fall onto ªrms in the electricity-generation and industrial sectors, po-
tentially diminishing the overall cost-effectiveness of the program.
These commentators argue that supplementing the upstream
program with efªciency standards—such as modiªed CAFE require-
ments—could address these market failures by forcing more energy-
efªcient products into the marketplace.170 For example, the program
originally proposed by Senators McCain and Lieberman in January
2003 would have established an upstream cap on transportation sec-
tor emissions, but also would have incorporated incentives for auto-
makers to sell more fuel-efªcient cars.171 The latter element was re-
moved from the version of the McCain-Lieberman bill that was voted
on in the Senate in October 2003.
Of course, any economy-wide upstream approach implies that
households will see price increases in gasoline and home heating fuels.
Policymakers concerned about shielding households from such price
increases might prefer alternatives to an economy-wide approach, such
as a downstream cap-and-trade program, which would shield consum-
ers from fuel price but not electricity price increases or a program that
combines a downstream program with product efªciency standards. In
assessing these alternatives, however, it is important to keep in mind
that program designs that shield households from overt price increases
                                                                                                                     
Climate Change, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from U.S. Transportation
22–23 (2003); Transp. Research Bd., supra note 59, at 64–65.
170 See infra Part IV.C.
171 See Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2002). The program
originally proposed by Senators McCain and Lieberman would have capped the carbon
content in fuels used for transportation purposes and would have allocated a portion of
the allowances to petroleum importers and reªners. At the same time, the program would
have encouraged the production and sale of more fuel-efªcient cars by providing that an
automaker that over-complied with the CAFE standards by 20% or more could convert its
excess CAFE credits into “registered GHG credits.” The automaker then would have been
able to sell these credits into the cap-and-trade program. Acknowledging that an im-
provement in fuel economy also would free up allowances for use by regulated petroleum
importers and reªners, the McCain-Lieberman program would have provided that anytime
an automaker was awarded GHG credits, the government would have to remove a corre-
sponding amount of allowances from the allotment to the transportation sector. This ap-
proach avoids a “double-counting” outcome.
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for gasoline and home heating fuels do not necessarily shield them
from higher costs. Alternative programs would put greater pressure on
other sectors to achieve the emissions target; their compliance costs
would come back to households in the form of higher prices for elec-
tricity and other goods and services. Indeed, because alternative de-
signs are less efªcient, the overall costs faced by households likely
would be higher under such designs. Additionally, any program design
that fails to provide a key sector with incentives to start shifting to lower-
emitting practices and products increases the costs of achieving deeper
emission reductions in the future. Finally, it should be noted that the
impact of an upstream program on fuel prices can be controlled, either
by starting with a moderate emissions cap or, as discussed in Part IV.A.4
below, by incorporating a safety valve approach.
c. Upstream/Downstream
Another approach is an upstream/downstream program that
would use the familiar design of the Clean Air Act acid rain program for
electricity generators, but would cover other sectors, such as the trans-
portation sector, with an upstream program. The program proposed by
Senators McCain and Lieberman reºects such an upstream/down-
stream design.172 An upstream/downstream program would require up-
stream suppliers of fuel, such as reªners, gas pipelines, and processors,
to hold allowances sufªcient to cover the carbon content of fuel they
deliver, subject to an exemption for deliveries to ªrms, such as electricity
generators, that are subject to downstream regulation. These down-
stream ªrms, in turn, would be required to hold allowances for their
emissions.
An upstream/downstream cap-and-trade that subjected electricity
generators to downstream regulation and made all transactions for
other uses subject to upstream regulation would end up with a some-
what greater number of regulated ªrms and would require a
signiªcantly more complex administrative system.173 For example, be-
cause electricity generators’ fossil fuel usage would be subject to a
                                                                                                                     
172 Though it reºects an upstream-downstream design, the McCain-Lieberman bill
would omit any controls on natural gas or oil used for non-transportation purposes. The
Progressive Policy Institute has proposed an upstream-downstream program. See Jan Ma-
zurek, Progressive Policy Inst., Cap Carbon Dioxide Now (2002), available at
http://www.ppionline.org/documents/co2_0602.pdf. The Center for Clean Air Policy also
has outlined an upstream-downstream program option. See Hargrave, supra note 88.
173 The program described by the Center for Clean Air Policy for purposes of its analy-
sis would encompass 8400 facilities. Hargrave, supra note 88, at 18.
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downstream allowance requirement, reªners’ sales of fuel oil to those
generators would be exempt from the upstream allowance require-
ment. This arrangement would make fuel destined for electricity gen-
erators less expensive than fuel destined for non-generators, such as
truckers and building owners, thus creating an incentive for genera-
tors to buy fuel and resell it to others. Regulatory controls would be
needed to prevent such behavior.
d. Sectoral Hybrids
A fourth approach would combine a cap-and-trade program cov-
ering large sources with efªciency standards for smaller sources in the
transportation sector and the residential and commercial buildings
sector. This hybrid approach is discussed in Part IV.C.
4. How Should Allowances Be Allocated?
Once a cap is set for the cap-and-trade program and it is deter-
mined what ªrms will be regulated, then a number of allowances
equal to the cap must be distributed for use within the economy. The
process for this distribution—the allowance allocation methodology—
is likely to be the most difªcult and potentially contentious issue in
designing a cap-and-trade program.
There are two fundamental choices for allowance allocations: (1)
distribution of allowances at no cost to ªrms affected by the regula-
tory program, or (2) an auction under which the government sells
allowances to the highest bidder, and uses the proceeds to compen-
sate affected ªrms, workers, or communities, to reduce taxes, or some
combination of the above. If free distribution is chosen, then policy-
makers will have to decide how to allocate allowances to ªrms or indi-
viduals. Several allocation methods have been suggested, based on
experience with existing electric generator cap-and-trade programs.
These include “grandfathering,” where allowances are allocated based
on emissions prior to the start-up of the regulatory program, and a
“generation performance standard,” which allocates allowances based
on post-start-up electric output, measured either as of a certain date
or on the basis of a periodic updating.174 If an auction is chosen, poli-
                                                                                                                     
174 Id. at 12. A number of recent economic studies have been critical of the Generation
Performance Standard (GPS) approach, asserting that it has the potential to degrade the
underlying cost-effectiveness of a cap-and-trade program. See, e.g., Dallas Burtraw et al.,
Res. for the Future, The Effect of Allowance Allocation on the Cost of Carbon
Emission Trading (2001) [hereinafter Burtraw et al., Allowance Allocation], avail-
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cymakers will have to decide on the disposition of the revenues from
the auction (revenue recycling). Recycling alternatives include direct
compensation to affected ªrms, workers, communities, or consumers,
and reductions in taxes on labor and capital.
The choice between auction and free distribution, and the sub-
sidiary choices respecting allocation method and revenue recycling,
have important implications both for the one who bears the cost of
the program and the program’s overall cost. These choices and their
implications are explored below.
a. Free Distribution
Under conventional “command-and-control” environmental regu-
lation, the regulated ªrm bears the direct costs of limiting emissions to
an allowable level, but is not required to purchase its entitlement to
allowable emissions.175 Free distribution of allowances reaches a com-
parable result under market-based regulation by providing an initial
                                                                                                                     
able at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-01-30.pdf; Dallas Burtraw et al., Res.
for the Future, The Effect on Asset Values of the Allocation of Carbon Dioxide
Emission Allowances (2002) [hereinafter Burtraw et al, Asset Values], available at
http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-02-15.pdf; Carolyn Fischer, Res. for the Fu-
ture, Rebating Environmental Policy Revenues: Output-Based Allocations and
Tradable Performance Standards (2001), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/
RFF-DP-01-22.pdf; David Harrison, Jr. & Daniel B. Radov, Nat’l Econ. Research As-
socs., Evaluation of Alternative Initial Allocation Mechanisms in a European
Union Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance Trading Scheme (2002) (prepared for
DG Environment, European Commission), available at http://www.nera.com/image/
5240_es.pdf; Lee Lane, Climate Policy Ctr., Allocation of Allowances and Con-
sumer Impact (2001), available at http://www.cpc-inc.org/library/ªles/13_lanemay
01.pdf. As between the two methods of free distribution, which appear to be applicable
only if allowances were distributed to utilities in any event, the papers rate the grandfather-
ing method higher than the GPS method. See, e.g., Burtraw et al., Asset Values, supra,
at 18. The GPS approach, they assert, degrades the cost-effectiveness of a cap-and-trade
program because it encourages relatively greater output from low-emitting generation—
since utilities earn allowances on the basis of their generation—and relatively less conserva-
tion—since greater output means relatively lower electricity prices. See, e.g., Burtraw et
al., Allowance Allocation, supra, at 22. By contrast, the grandfathering approach does
not distort the incentives created by the emissions cap. See Burtraw et al., Asset Values,
supra, at 10. Burtraw et al. further assert that utilities themselves should prefer alternatives
to a GPS approach, because the lower electricity prices resulting under the GPS approach
erode the value of utility assets. See id. Indeed, Burtraw et al. conclude that utilities may be
better off paying for allowances than receiving them for free on a GPS basis. See id. What
explains this seeming paradox? Electricity prices are higher under an auction than under a
GPS approach, resulting in greater revenues for utilities. Therefore, so long as utilities can
pass along most of the costs of allowance purchases to their customers, the relative beneªts
of higher revenues under the auction will exceed the greater costs.
175 See Stavins, supra note 87, at 300.
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free allocation of allowances to ªrms affected by the program. This ap-
proach was used in the CAA acid rain program.176
A number of recent studies argue for a departure from the acid
rain model in the context of a GHG cap-and-trade program, for sev-
eral reasons.177 First, the studies indicate that the allowances created
by a U.S. GHG trading program could have substantially greater value
than acid rain allowances under the CAA.178 Second, these studies—if
correct—indicate that free distribution of 100% of allowances to regu-
lated ªrms would overcompensate them for their lost proªts, because
these ªrms can pass through to customers much of their costs of
compliance. One study found that for a stand-alone electric generator
cap-and-trade program, free distribution of all allowances to the elec-
tricity generators would increase the sector’s net worth by ªfty per-
cent,179 implying—if the analysis is correct—that power producers in
the aggregate would be better off with mandatory GHG regulation
modeled on the acid rain program than they would be with no GHG
regulation at all. Of course, the impacts on allowance recipients
would depend on the method of free distribution and would vary on a
                                                                                                                     
176 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651(e) (2000).
177 See, e.g., Burtraw et al., Allowance Allocation, supra note 174; Burtraw et al.,
Asset Values, supra note 174; Lawrence H. Goulder, Res. for the Future, Confronting
the Adverse Industry Impacts of CO2 Abatement Policies: What Does it Cost? (2000)
[hereinafter Goulder, Abatement Policies], available at http://www.rff.org/Docu-
ments/RFF-CCIB-23.pdf; Lawrence H. Goulder, Res. for the Future, Mitigating the
Adverse Impacts of CO2 Abatement Policies on Energy-Intensive Industries (2001)
[hereinafter Goulder, Adverse Impacts] (on ªle with authors); Harrison & Radov, supra
note 174; Lane, supra note 174; Smith & Ross, supra note 118.
178 See, e.g., Smith & Ross, supra note 118, at 21. For example, the Smith & Ross study
calculates that a U.S. program that aimed to achieve reductions on par with the U.S. target
under the Kyoto Protocol would create U.S. allowances with a total present value of $1.8
trillion, which is roughly equivalent to three percent of the entire capital base of the
United States. See id. The U.S. Energy Information Administration has determined that full
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol—if it were to be achieved through economy-wide
trading aimed at achieving a more than a 30% reduction in emissions from BAU levels—
would create allowances with a total annual value of approximately $450 billion in 2010 (in
1997 dollars). See Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Impacts of the Kyoto
Protocol on U.S. Energy Markets and Economic Activity, at xxi (1998). Even a more
moderate program could create a high-value asset. Economists from Resources for the
Future assert that a program that aimed to achieve reductions from the electricity sector of
only six percent from business-as-usual levels in 2012—or a reduction in 35 million metric
tons from BAU levels—would establish a pool of allowances worth $14.8 to $23.6 billion
per year. See Burtraw et al., Allowance Allocation, supra note 174, at 6. By contrast,
the acid rain program creates allowances worth a total of $2.7 billion in 2010. See id. at 6.
These studies are cited to show a range of the estimates of the costs of a comprehensive
U.S. program. They do not reºect the judgment of the authors as to likely costs.
179 See Smith & Ross, supra note 118, at 5.
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ªrm-by-ªrm basis. That is, utilities heavily reliant on coal would fare
worse than utilities with natural gas, nuclear, or renewable power
plants.180 In addition, overcompensation might not be an issue for
utilities subject to cost-of-service regulation if, for purposes of setting
customers’ rates, regulators required that utilities value the allowances
at their cost—zero—rather than at their market value.181
In any event, distribution of all of the allowances to ªrms subject
to the cap would do nothing to alleviate the ªnancial losses borne by
ªrms and consumers not subject to the cap. For example, absent some
compensation mechanism under any GHG cap-and-trade program,
both coal producers and owners of coal-ªred power plants would suf-
fer a substantial proportion of the ªnancial losses resulting from the
emissions cap. Yet, under a downstream program where allowances
were allocated only to electricity generators subject to the cap, coal
producers would receive no relief, even though, according to one
study, their projected equity losses could be more than sixty per-
cent.182 Nor would this approach to allowance allocation provide any
relief to coal miners who might face signiªcant losses in income. Simi-
larly, under an upstream trading program, distribution of allowances
to fuel transporters and processors subject to the cap would do noth-
ing to address the ªnancial losses of the electricity generators down-
stream from the point of regulation, which would be paying more for
coal and natural gas. Moreover, neither approach would address the
impacts on other ªrms and on households, both of which would face
signiªcantly higher energy prices as a result of either an upstream or
downstream trading program,183 or the likely reduction in federal tax
                                                                                                                     
180 See Burtraw et al., Asset Values, supra note 174; Goulder, Adverse Impacts,
supra note 177, at 17–18 (ªnding that, in a scenario in which all allowances are distributed
gratis to fuel producers, coal industry proªts will rise by 155% in 2002 and by 218% in
2025—coal industry equity values increase by a factor of seven over the same time period).
181 See Burtraw et al., Allowance Allocation, supra note 174, at 7. Under cost-of-
service regulation, a utility’s rates are set administratively based on the costs incurred in
providing electricity service. Id. In the acid rain program, most regulators have treated
grandfathered allowances as zero-cost assets, because they were distributed to utilities for
free. See id. Accordingly, utility regulators generally have not taken into account the oppor-
tunity costs of surrendering an acid rain allowance instead of selling it in the market. See
id. at 6. As a result, most utilities have not been allowed to pass on these opportunity costs
to their ratepayers in the form of higher electricity prices. See id. at 20.
182 See Smith & Ross, supra note 118, at 25.
183 See id. at 4–5 (demonstrating that coal miners and coal mining communities could be
particularly hard hit by a GHG regulation program); Jim Barrett, Pew Ctr. on Global
Climate Change, Worker Transition & Global Climate Change (2001), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/worker_transition.pdf; Judith M. Greenwald et
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revenues because of reduced levels of economic activity attributable to
the program.184
For these reasons, these recent economic studies urge policymak-
ers to de-link the allocation of allowances from the incidence of regula-
tion, and to link it instead to economic losses attributable to the regula-
tory program. In this regard, an important ªnding of the allowance
allocation studies is that the government might need to distribute only
a relatively small percentage—six to thirteen percent—of the total al-
lowances to energy sector ªrms to eliminate their equity losses from an
efªcient upstream cap-and-trade program.185 If correct, this means the
government could distribute the value of the balance of the allowances
to achieve other ends—for example, to assist burdened ªrms outside
the energy sector, to help consumers, to aid particularly hard-hit work-
ers or their communities, or to prevent a decline in government reve-
nues.186 It should be noted, however, that these conclusions are criti-
cally dependent on the details of the regulatory program and on
modeling techniques. As discussed below, if the regulatory program
were less efªcient than an upstream cap-and-trade program, or if the
period for allocation of allowances to compensate affected energy ªrms
were limited to ten years for example, then the percentage of allowance
value allocated to the ªrms would have to be higher and the percent-
age available for other uses would be, at least initially, much smaller.
These studies also add an important perspective on the long-
standing debate on whether, in a free distribution regime, allowances
should be allocated on a grandfathering or generation performance
standard basis. If a policy objective of allowance allocation is to com-
pensate ªrms affected by the cap-and-trade program for their lost
                                                                                                                     
al., Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Community Adjustment to Climate Change
Policy (2001), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/community_adjust.pdf.
184 See Smith & Ross, supra note 118, at 21. A critical ªnding of the Smith & Ross study
was that the GHG program it modeled would reduce U.S. tax revenues by $50 billion in
2010. This would correspond to 56% of the total value of the allowances created under the
program. See id.
185 Goulder, Adverse Impacts, supra note 177; Smith & Ross, supra note 118.
186 See, e.g., Clean Power Act of 2003, S. 366, 108th Cong. § 707 (2003). S. 366 would
establish a utility cap-and-trade program covering emissions of CO2, NOx, and SO2. See id.
Under the S. 366 scheme, the government would allocate allowances annually to six cate-
gories: (1) electricity consumers; (2) transition assistance; (3) renewable electricity gener-
ating units, efªciency projects, and cleaner energy sources; (4) electricity generating facili-
ties; (5) encourage biological carbon sequestration; and (6) encourage geological carbon
sequestration. For a number of the categories, allowances would go to a trustee, who then
would be responsible for selling the allowances and redistributing the revenues according
to various formulae. See id.
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proªts, allowances should be distributed to ªrms on the basis of their
projected ªnancial losses from the emissions cap, not past emissions or
current output. This is because a ªrm’s economic losses are not neces-
sarily related to its output or emissions. Determining the amount of
such losses on a ªrm-by-ªrm basis could be complex, but it could be
done administratively in the same way “stranded investment” is deter-
mined in electric restructuring proceedings.187
b. Allowance Auction and Revenue Recycling
A number of economists and policy analysts advocate for the gov-
ernmental distribution of allowances through an auction or, alterna-
tively, through a ªduciary.188 They cite two advantages of this ap-
proach.189 First, it could potentially provide a less cumbersome
mechanism for distributing the value of the allowances to groups suf-
fering ªnancial losses from a GHG emissions cap. Instead of giving
consumers and others allowances to sell, the government itself could
sell the allowances and recycle the revenue to the economically vulner-
able groups through lump-sum payments or aid programs; the gov-
ernment also could retain some of the revenues to prevent erosion of
the federal tax base.
Recycled revenues could further be used to reduce distortionary
taxes that produce a net drag on the economy. Economists argue that
existing wage-related taxes create a disincentive to work, and that ex-
isting taxes on interest, dividends, capital gains, and corporate in-
come discourage productive investments. According to this argument,
using the proceeds of an allowance auction to reduce taxes on in-
come or investment, rather than as a means of direct compensation,
                                                                                                                     
187 See 75 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,080 (Apr. 24, 1996) (commonly known as Order 888).
188 For studies proposing an auction approach, see, for example, Burtraw et al., Al-
lowance Allocation, supra note 174; Cong. Budget Ofªce, supra note 85; Peter Cram-
ton & Suzi Kerr, Res. for the Future, Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and
Why to Auction Not Grandfather 3–17 (1998); Goulder, Adverse Impacts, supra note
177; Smith & Ross, supra note 118. Both the Jeffords bill and the McCain-Lieberman bill
would distribute allowances to a designated ªduciary and direct the ªduciary to use the pro-
ceeds from allowance sales to achieve certain purposes. See S. 366 § 707 (establishing a trus-
tee); S. 139(C) (establishing the “Climate Change Credit Corporation”).
189 See, e.g., Anne E. Smith et al., Charles River Assocs., Implications of Trading
Implementation Design for Equity-Efªcient Trade-offs in Carbon Permit Alloca-
tions (2002).
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would result in overall economic gains that could signiªcantly reduce
the cost of GHG regulation to society as a whole.190
A number of recent studies, including a study conducted by
Charles River Associates (CRA), described below in Box 3, look at the
efªciency implications of different design options for a cap-and-trade
program.191 While the quantitative results of these studies are very
much dependant on modeling assumptions, they are useful in illus-
trating the interactions of the design elements of a cap-and-trade pro-
gram.192 First, compensatory allowance allocations to energy sector
ªrms, if they are made on a permanent basis, appear to require only a
small percentage of allowances or allowance revenues.193 However, if
these allocations are made over a relatively short transition period—
ten years, for example—then the percentage allocated to these ªrms
will have to be much larger in the early years of the program. Second,
if the program is designed to be revenue-neutral to the federal gov-
ernment and policymakers assume no offsetting ªscal beneªts from
the program, then a large proportion of auction revenues—in the
CRA analysis of an upstream cap-and-trade program, about ªfty per-
cent—would be retained by the government.194 Third, in the CRA
analysis of an upstream cap-and-trade program, once prior claims are
satisªed, the allowance proceeds that remain are sufªcient to reduce
the social cost of the trading program by thirty-ªve percent, if the
proceeds are dedicated to reducing marginal tax rates.195 Fourth, if
policymakers settle on a program that is less cost-effective than an up-
                                                                                                                     
190 Economists are careful to note that such efªciency improvements would result only
from reductions in marginal taxes. Increases in standard deductions or other per-person
or per-household rebates, on the other hand, do not produce such economic gains. See
Smith & Ross, supra note 118, at 14. Such approaches just redistribute the costs of the
GHG regulatory program. See id. At one time it was believed that recycling revenues from
an allowance auction to reduce distortionary taxes would not merely offset some of the
costs of a GHG emissions cap, but would also generate a net gain in GDP. This implied that
a GHG cap-and-trade program could provide a “double dividend” of environmental
beneªts and economic development. More recent research suggests that this result is
highly unlikely because the interaction of the emissions cap and existing distortionary
taxes (the “tax interaction effect”) makes GHG regulation more costly than was previously
believed. See I. Parry et al., When Can Carbon Abatement Policies Increase Welfare? The Funda-
mental Role of Distorted Factor Markets, 37 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 52, 74 (1999) (ªnding
that the cost to the U.S. economy of a 15% reduction in CO2 emissions is 2.6 times greater
when the tax interaction effect is taken into account).
191 See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 189.
192 See, e.g., id.
193 See, e.g., id.
194 See id.
195 See id.
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stream cap-and-trade program, then the costs imposed by the regula-
tory program will increase while the total allowance proceeds avail-
able to the government to address those costs will decrease.
For all of these reasons, choices respecting allowance allocation
have important implications, both for cost-effectiveness and distribu-
tional equity. They also raise political feasibility issues. For example,
the practice of requiring regulated ªrms to purchase allowances
through a government auction could be characterized by its oppo-
nents as a new tax. In addition, obtaining the efªciency beneªts of
revenue recycling implies taking on not only development of a GHG
regulatory program but also tax reform.
Box 3: Modeling Design Alternatives for Allowance Allocation:
Results of One Study
The CRA study illustrates the potential impacts of design alterna-
tives for distributing the allowances under a cap-and-trade program.196
The study models an upstream cap-and-trade program that would re-
duce U.S. GHG emissions to year-2000 levels in 2010.197 The model
was run without a number of the ºexibility measures described
above—such as international GHG trading, domestic sequestration,
and reductions in non-CO2 gases—and did not take into account any
beneªts of avoided climate change damage that may result from the
program.198 This scenario shows a long-run reduction in welfare of
about 0.4%.199 Assuming allowance allocations were permanent, only
about six percent of allowances would have to be allocated to ªrms in
the energy sector to compensate ªrms for equity losses resulting from
the upstream cap-and-trade program.200 However, about ªfty percent
of auction revenues would need to be retained by the federal gov-
                                                                                                                     
196 Smith et al., supra note 189.
197 See id. at 12.
198 See id.
199 Id. at 21 ªg.4.
200 Id. at 14. The CRA study deªnes the energy sectors as including those ªrms en-
gaged in coal mining, crude oil extraction, natural gas production and extraction, petro-
leum reªning, and electricity generation. Id. at 10 tbl.1. The percentage of allowance pro-
ceeds needed to preserve existing assets is highly dependent on a number of assumptions.
For example, in a 2002 study done for the Center for Clean Air Policy, Charles River Asso-
ciates used a different modeling design and arrived at percentages ranging from 9% to
21%. See Smith & Ross, supra note 118, at 25. In both that study and the 2002 study dis-
cussed in Box 3, the results varied depending on a number of factors, including the as-
sumed scope of trading in the U.S. domestic program and the availability of international
emissions trading. See Smith & Ross, supra note 118, at 25.
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ernment to offset revenue losses attributable to the decrease in GDP
resulting from the program, assuming that the program is to be reve-
nue-neutral vis-a-vis the federal government, and that there are no
offsetting ªscal beneªts from mitigating climate change.201 If the bal-
ance of the revenues—about 40%—were used to reduce marginal
personal income tax rates, the efªciency gains from this tax reduction
would reduce the overall cost of the program by about 35%, so that
the long-term welfare loss would be about 0.25%.202
In contrast to an upstream cap-and-trade program, a downstream
cap-and-trade program combined with an increase in CAFE standards
to 35.0 mpg would reduce welfare by about 0.8% in the long run,
even with the beneªt of income tax reductions.203 It would also entail
a larger share of allowances for the federal government if the pro-
gram is to be revenue-neutral for the federal government. At the same
time, because fewer sources would be subject to a cap-and-trade pro-
gram, the pool of allowance proceeds from which to achieve such
compensation would be smaller.204
5. Emissions Certainty Versus Cost Certainty
The third critical design issue in designing an emissions trading
program is determining what balance to strike between certainty
about achieving a particular level of emission reductions and certainty
about costs of compliance.
Policymakers can limit the costs of complying with an emissions
trading program through a safety valve feature, which would author-
ize the government to sell additional allowances at a predetermined
price.205 With a safety valve mechanism in place, the market price of
allowances—and therefore the marginal cost of abatement—will rise
no higher than the safety valve price.206 The effect is to cap compli-
ance costs.207
                                                                                                                     
201 Smith et al., supra note 189, at 16.
202 Id. at 20.
203 Id. at 20–23.
204 Note that this scenario does not include the trading features discussed below in
connection with a sectoral hybrid program.
205 See Jacoby & Ellerman, supra note 93.
206 See id.
207 See id. at 4. During discussions in 1999 regarding proposed “credit for early action”
legislation, staff at the Resources for the Future suggested the use of a safety valve ap-
proach. See Raymond Kopp et al., A Proposal for Credible Early Action in U.S. Climate Policy,
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Establishing a safety valve, however, implies that emissions are not
capped. If compliance costs turn out to be higher than expected, ªrms
can purchase more allowances and total emissions can rise above the
cap. This is not to say that emissions would be entirely unlimited—ªrms
would have to pay the safety valve price to increase their emissions—but
the safety valve option would mean that there was not a precise and ab-
solute cap. Thus, the safety valve option presents policymakers with a
potential trade-off between emissions certainty and compliance cost
certainty.
How important is certainty about meeting a particular emissions
cap? The atmosphere is not particularly sensitive to small differences
in emission levels. Scientists have not identiªed a particular threshold
level over which the potential for damage is great. For these reasons,
policymakers might not attach signiªcant value to assurances that the
United States will meet a particular, near-term emissions target with
precision.
By contrast, assurances that the compliance costs will not rise
above a particular per-ton level could be central to building political
support for moving forward on climate change. There are signiªcant
differences in opinion on how much it will cost to reduce GHG emis-
sions in the United States because the cost would be largely a function
of future levels of economic activity, which are difªcult to forecast.208
Yet, establishing a cap-and-trade program without a safety valve
mechanism means that the cap will have to be met, regardless of cost.
A safety valve mechanism can help remove cost uncertainties as a bar-
rier to action.209
                                                                                                                     
Weathervane (Feb. 1999), at http://www.weathervane.rff.org/features/feature060.html
(last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
208 See Jacoby & Ellerman, supra note 93, at 6–7.
209 A number of the extant proposals for domestic and international cap-and-trade
programs include a safety valve provision or similar mechanism. See, e.g., Joseph E. Aldy
et al., Climate Change: An Agenda for Global Collective Action 27 (2001), avail-
able at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/stiglitz.pdf; Climate Policy Ctr., supra
note 164; Warwick J. McKibbin & Peter J. Wilcoxen, The Brookings Inst., The Next
Step for Climate Change Policy (2000), available at http://www.brookings.org/
views/papers/mckibbin/20000201.htm; David G. Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto
Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming (2001); Competing Utility Emis-
sions Plans May Create Congressional Hurdle, supra note 157 (describing proposal of the
“Clean Power Group,” which includes a “circuit-breaker” provision that works like a safety
valve). In addition, the Bush Administration’s proposed “Clear Skies Act” legislation—
which would set controls on nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and mercury—incorporates a
safety valve. See S. 2815, 107th Cong. § 403 (2002).
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Some commentators argue that a safety valve mechanism inevita-
bly would be an “easy out,” diminishing incentives for ªrms to inno-
vate or to build a bank of early reductions, both of which are key fac-
tors in driving down the long-term costs of reducing emissions.210
However, other commentators have argued that a safety valve option
could make risk-averse households and ªrms willing to accept a more
aggressive emissions cap—and therefore higher emissions price—
than otherwise would be the case, because they would have assurances
that their costs would not exceed the safety valve level.211
Ultimately, the decision whether to adopt a safety valve approach
could depend on the timing and stringency of the regulatory pro-
gram. Because the United States has elected not to become a party to
the Kyoto Protocol, at least for now, U.S. policymakers have ºexibility
in setting the emissions target and compliance timetable for a domes-
tic climate program.212 They might opt for a gradual approach, that is,
an approach that aims to make a start in reducing U.S. emissions
while keeping compliance costs low. If policymakers design such a
moderate, and therefore relatively lower-cost program, they might
reasonably conclude that a safety valve provision is unnecessary and
opt instead for certainty in meeting the target. Alternatively, they
could incorporate a safety valve in the program’s early stages and raise
the safety valve price over time.213
                                                                                                                     
210 Environmental Defense, an environmental advocacy organization that has been a
pioneer in designing and promoting market-based approaches to environmental protec-
tion, has made these arguments. See, e.g., Envtl. Def., From Obstacle to Opportunity:
How Acid Rain Emissions Trading Is Delivering Cleaner Air 36–37 (2000) available at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/645_SO2.pdf.
211 See Aldy et al., supra note 209.
212 See Kopp et al., supra note 207.
213 See Pizer, supra note 104; see also William Pizer, Combining Price and Quantity Controls
to Mitigate Global Climate Change, 85 J. Pub. Econ. 409, 431 (2002). In a set of studies,
economist Martin Weitzman was the ªrst to ªnd that where costs of compliance are uncer-
tain, “quantity controls,” such as cap-and-trade programs, and “price controls,” such as
emission taxes, result in different levels of efªciency. See Martin Weitzman, Prices v. Quanti-
ties, 41 Rev. Econ. Stud. 477, 485–87 (1974). Weitzman determined that, where costs are
uncertain and the marginal beneªts of regulation—i.e., the environmental damage
avoided—are relatively ºat, ªxing the price ªrst results in a level of costs that approximates
what the optimal price will turn out to be once costs are known. See id. By contrast, if the
marginal beneªts of regulation rise steeply—this would occur in situations in which envi-
ronmental damage is catastrophic after a certain level of emissions—ªxing the quantity
ªrst results in a level of control likely to be in the range of what would be optimal once
costs are known. See id. One way to look at an emissions trading program with a safety valve
mechanism is as a hybrid approach, combining elements of a cap-and-trade program and
an emissions tax. See id. Pizer has modeled application of such a hybrid approach to cli-
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6. Evaluation of Cap-and-Trade Programs
Environmental Effectiveness: A cap-and-trade program, if compre-
hensive in coverage and properly administered, can be highly effective
in meeting its target. A comprehensive upstream cap-and-trade pro-
gram would be environmentally effective as to CO2, but may not be fea-
sible for other gases or sinks. A large-source downstream program
could be equally effective with respect to the sectors it covered, but
would have to be supported by other measures to provide full coverage.
An all-sector downstream program is likely to be ineffective because it
could be administered and enforced only with great difªculty.
Cost-Effectiveness: Cap-and-trade programs, if they include
ºexibility measures, can attain emission reductions at low cost. Allow-
ance allocation policies could increase or decrease the costs imposed
by the program.
Administrative Feasibility: An upstream cap-and-trade program ap-
pears to be fully administrable for CO2 and for certain other GHGs.
An all-sector downstream cap-and-trade does not appear to be feasible
because of the number of regulated ªrms involved. A hybrid program
that combines a downstream cap-and-trade for large sources with an
upstream program applicable to suppliers of fuel for smaller sources
appears to be feasible, though somewhat more complex than a full
upstream program.
Distributional Equity: The distributional consequences of a cap-
and-trade program depend critically on how allowances are allocated,
or—if they are auctioned—how the auction proceeds are distributed.
Political Acceptability: Because any all-sector cap-and-trade pro-
gram, whether upstream or downstream, will drive up consumer costs
for gasoline, natural gas, and home heating oil, it is likely to be politi-
cally difªcult. An all-source downstream cap-and-trade, because it im-
plies regulating millions of sources, is likely to be even more difªcult.
A downstream cap-and-trade program limited to electricity generators
and other large stationary sources could be more acceptable politi-
cally, but to be effective it would have to be coupled with a regulatory
program to cover other sectors.
                                                                                                                     
mate policy and found substantial gains over a pure quantitative—i.e., cap-and-trade—
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B. GHG Tax
1. Overview of GHG Tax Approach
Another market-based approach to reducing GHG emissions is a
GHG tax program. Under such a program, policymakers would im-
pose a per-ton fee on CO2 emissions or on the carbon content of fuel.
Other GHG emissions, to the extent measurable, would also be taxed.
In addition, the program could be designed so that ªrms earn a tax
credit for CO2 emissions reduced through land-based sequestration
projects, carbon capture projects, or for project-based reductions in
GHGs that are not subject to tax. Firms subject to the tax would have
an incentive to reduce their emissions—thereby avoiding the tax—
until the cost of achieving reductions exceeded the cost of paying the
tax. Accordingly, as with an emissions trading program that incorpo-
rates a safety valve, a tax program would provide near-term cost cer-
tainty but not absolute near-term emissions certainty.
A tax program would offer practically all of the ºexibility, and
therefore cost-effectiveness, of an emissions trading program. Firms
would have the incentive and the opportunity to adopt the lowest-cost
means of reducing their energy-related emissions; the “payment” for
additional reductions would take the form of tax savings. Just as ªrms
subject to an emissions trading program could bank excess allow-
ances, ªrms participating in an emissions tax program could literally
bank their tax savings from reducing their emissions. Tax credits also
could be made available for emission reductions achieved through
projects ªnanced in other countries or for valid emission allowances
acquired from other countries’ regulatory programs.214
Designing a domestic GHG tax program would raise some of the
same fundamental issues that arise in designing an emissions trading
program. For example, it would be necessary to determine whether
                                                                                                                     
214 A carbon tax program might have difªculty in accommodating those ªrms that
otherwise would be able to sell their surplus U.S. allowances into an international emis-
sions trading market. See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Res. for the Future,
What Has Kyoto Wrought? The Real Architecture of International Tradable
Permit Markets (1999), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-99-30.pdf.
However, this may be an immaterial concern since, as discussed above, under the Marra-
kech Accords that implement the Kyoto Protocol, there appears to be little possibility that
U.S. reductions can be credited against other countries’ emission reduction obligations
under the Protocol, though nothing in the Marrakech Accords precludes the United
States from establishing a GHG program that credits Kyoto units. See supra text accompany-
ing note 128.
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the program should tax upstream ªrms, downstream ªrms, or some
combination of the two. The analysis is largely the same as that for an
emissions trading program. A downstream tax would take the form of
a tax on CO2 and certain other GHG emissions. Because enforcing the
tax would require tracking the emissions of each ªrm subject to the
tax, a downstream emissions tax, like a downstream emissions trading
program, could not feasibly reach all of the hundreds of millions of
sources of CO2 emissions in the economy. An upstream tax program
would take the form of a tax on the carbon content of fuels sold into
the energy system. Like an upstream emissions trading program, an
upstream GHG tax could be applied to a few thousand ªrms that
produce, reªne, and market fuels. The tax on these ªrms would lead
to higher prices for carbon-intensive fuel and higher prices for en-
ergy. The program thus could effectively regulate the entire energy
system, providing downstream ªrms with incentives to switch fuels,
increase energy efªciency, and reduce energy use.
A tax program would raise revenue in much the same way as
would an emissions trading program with an allowance auction. Ac-
cordingly, a tax program would offer an opportunity to reduce distor-
tionary taxes on labor or capital. In addition, revenues from the tax
could be used for any of the purposes described above with regard to
revenues from an allowance auction, such as assisting vulnerable
workers and communities.
In addition, it is possible to design a tax program to mimic the
effect of free distribution of allowances under an emissions trading
program. How would this work? The tax program could offer an ex-
emption from the tax up to a certain ªxed amount of tons of carbon
supplied (upstream) or emitted (downstream).215 As with free alloca-
tion of allowances, a tax program could base the size of the exemp-
tion on particular characteristics of the ªrms, such as output in a base
year. The tax program still could achieve its environmental objective
so long as ªrms remain subject to the tax at the margin, that is, for
the last tons supplied (upstream) or emitted (downstream). However,
as with free allocation of allowances in an emissions trading program,
a modiªed tax would reduce the burden of the program on those
ªrms directly subject to the tax, but would not assist ªrms and con-
sumers suffering indirect costs from the tax program. They would not
                                                                                                                     
215 See Goulder, Abatement Policies, supra note 177, at 3–4. For a tax exemption to
be fully equivalent to free distribution, the exemption would have to be converted to some
form of tradable tax credit.
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pay the tax and therefore would not beneªt from the partial exemp-
tion, yet they still would bear ªnancial losses as a result of the pro-
gram. Of course, opting for this kind of modiªed GHG tax would re-
duce the total revenues brought in by the tax program and therefore
reduce the ability to achieve other objectives with those revenues.
Finally, the major problem with a GHG tax is that it is a tax. As
noted above, U.S. experience since 1973 indicates that taxes as an in-
strument of energy or environmental policy, no matter how pressing
the need, have not been accepted by Congress or the public.216 Thus,
a workable GHG tax system could be devised, but its adoption would
appear to contradict conventional political wisdom. On the other
hand, a GHG tax system could be politically palatable if it were an in-
tegral part of a comprehensive reform of the tax code, in which the
GHG tax replaced or reduced other, even less popular taxes.
2. Evaluation of GHG Tax Approach
Environmental Effectiveness: A GHG tax program (upstream) could
be highly effective in reducing U.S. GHG emissions because of its
economy-wide coverage of CO2 emissions. However, if certainty in
meeting a particular short-term emissions target were a priority, a tax
program would be less preferable than an upstream cap-and-trade
program. As with a trading program, sources and sinks not amenable
to direct taxation would have to be addressed through a tax credit
mechanism or through standards.
Cost-Effectiveness: A GHG tax program would offer all sources incen-
tives and opportunities to adopt their least-cost mitigation options. As a
price-based program, a tax program would offer certainty as to compli-
ance costs. As with allowance allocation, different use of the tax reve-
nues could decrease or increase the total cost imposed by the program.
Administrative Feasibility: An upstream GHG tax program would
not present signiªcant administrative complexities. An economy-wide
downstream GHG tax program, on the other hand, would be adminis-
tratively infeasible.
Distributional Equity: The distributional consequences of a GHG
tax depend critically on how tax revenues are used.
Political Acceptability: Experience suggests that Americans are
reºexively opposed both to tax programs and to gasoline price in-
creases. The GHG tax combines the two.217 A GHG tax approach
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might have some appeal if introduced as part of a tax reform package
that included cuts in income or payroll taxes.
C. Sectoral Hybrid Program
1. Introduction
The ªnal of the three major design options for a U.S. climate
change program analyzed in this paper is a sectoral hybrid program.
A sectoral hybrid program could combine a downstream cap-and-
trade program for large sources in the electricity and industrial sec-
tors with enhanced product efªciency standards to cover small GHG
sources—mainly consumer products and equipment—in the trans-
portation, residential, and building sectors.218 This hybrid approach
has the potential of avoiding some of the political challenges associ-
ated with a full upstream cap-and-trade program or GHG tax.
A sectoral hybrid program would provide a mechanism to reach
transportation and household emissions that policymakers may be
unwilling or unable to regulate directly—as through a downstream
cap-and-trade program, or through regulation of fuels—as through an
upstream cap-and-trade program. The standards component of the
program would regulate the performance characteristics of newly-
manufactured products used in the transportation sector and in the
residential and commercial buildings sector. For example, while it
would not be administratively feasible to directly regulate every
household on the basis of its furnace use or every motorist on the ba-
sis of emissions resulting from use of his or her motor vehicle, it
would be feasible to implement standards that force more energy-
efªcient furnaces and more fuel-efªcient cars into the marketplace.
One advantage of using product efªciency standards to comple-
ment a cap-and-trade program is that policymakers could build upon
the energy efªciency standards already in effect under U.S. law. Some
of the ºexibility beneªts of a cap-and-trade program can be attained
by establishing “tradable” standards, thus providing a degree of ex-
change between sectors subject to a cap-and-trade program and sec-
tors subject to standards. While a sectoral hybrid program could be
attractive to policymakers because it starts with familiar elements, it
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would require addressing or accepting a number of problematic as-
pects of a product efªciency standards program. A sectoral hybrid still
would leave noticeable gaps in emissions coverage, unless current
efªciency standards were signiªcantly expanded. In addition, trans-
forming conventional standards into tradable standards and coordi-
nating the standards program with the cap-and-trade program would
pose considerable administrative challenges. And even if these obsta-
cles could be overcome, a standards program remains inherently less
cost-effective than a full upstream cap-and-trade program because
standards do not provide any incentives to reduce use, nor do they
dictate the rate at which end-users replace their old products for
more efªcient, new ones.
Box 4: Example of a Sectoral Hybrid Program
PHASE I
Tradable Standards:
Autos: All automobiles using gasoline or diesel fuel would be sub-
ject to a tightened CAFE standard that would be translated into a “mpg-
equivalent standard” for CO2 emission trading purposes. Manufacturers
could trade between product lines, with each other, and with ªrms sub-
ject to cap-and-trade programs. Non-automobile engines using gasoline
or diesel would be subject to comparable standards.
Appliances: Appliance standards for gas and oil-ªred equipment
could be strengthened and converted to CO2 emission standards, and
expanded to cover all natural gas and oil-ªred equipment used in
residential or commercial applications that consume any signiªcant
amount of energy. As with autos, manufacturers could trade among
covered product lines, among manufacturers, and with ªrms subject
to cap-and-trade. Efªciency standards for electric appliances would be
retained to prevent electric appliances from gaining a competitive
advantage over gas appliances subject to standards.
Downstream Cap-and-Trade: Electricity generators and other large
stationary sources would be subject to a downstream cap-and-trade
program modeled on the CAA acid rain program. Flexibility measures
would be included. Sources and sinks of GHGs not covered by the
cap-and-trade program or standards would be addressed through pro-
ject-based credit trading. Policymakers could consider establishing a
safety valve.
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Allowance Allocation: A percentage of allowances would be distrib-
uted free to electricity generators, coal producers, and certain indus-
trial energy users for a limited period. The balance would be auc-
tioned.
Revenue Recycling: Auction revenues would be used to reduce
taxes and for lump-sum payments to individuals and/or communities.
POTENTIAL PHASE II
Upstream Cap-and-Trade: Reªners, gas pipelines, coal processors,
fossil-fuel importers, and certain other ªrms would be required to
surrender allowances to cover the carbon content of fossil fuels sold
or used by those ªrms. Full ºexibility would be permitted, including
trading with the sectors outside the upstream cap-and-trade program.
However, the following sales and uses would be exempt from the up-
stream allowance requirement, because they would be controlled di-
rectly or indirectly by the downstream cap-and-trade or the product
efªciency standards program:
1. Gasoline or diesel fuel sold or used in automobiles or engines.
2. Natural gas, natural gas liquids, or fuel oil sold for use in a
residential or commercial building.
3. Any fuel used in an electric generation unit or other large sta-
tionary source covered by the downstream program.
Sources and sinks of GHGs not covered by the cap-and-trade program
would be addressed through project-based crediting.
2. Designing the Standards Component of a Sectoral Hybrid Program
Designing the product efªciency standards component of a sec-
toral hybrid would involve a number of steps. First, it would be neces-
sary to adapt existing standards to the new purpose of regulating
GHG emissions. Second, policymakers may decide that it is necessary
to develop new standards for products and processes not now covered
by standards. Third, policymakers may want to formulate many of the
standards as tradable standards.
Most existing standards are expressed in terms of an energy
efªciency requirement, for example, miles per gallon. In a climate
program, policymakers would need to translate these standards from
energy per unit of output to GHG emissions per unit of output, or at
least adjust the standards to reºect the carbon content of different
fuels. To achieve broad coverage of emissions, a sectoral hybrid pro-
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gram would necessitate the establishment of a range of new standards.
While standards currently are in place for most major energy-using
consumer products and equipment—including motor vehicles and
residential and commercial natural gas and oil-ªred equipment—
standards do not apply to most commercial and industrial equip-
ment.219 Federal standards also do not apply to building envelopes,
that is, heat loss and heat gain from buildings. For example, air condi-
tioner standards will ultimately result in more efªcient air condition-
ers replacing less efªcient ones, but they do not deal with energy loss
from uninsulated buildings. Most importantly, however, standards are
not currently in place for a range of sources in the transportation sec-
tor, including locomotives, vessels, aircraft, buses, and heavy trucks;
these uncovered sources accounted for nearly ªfty percent of GHG
emissions in the transportation sector in 2002.220 For these reasons,
combining a large-source cap-and-trade program with existing stan-
dards only would reach approximately eighty percent of the nation’s
energy-related CO2 emissions.221
Another design consideration is the inºexibility of conventional
standards. Typically, standards reºect a command-and-control ap-
proach—that is to say, they prescribe a uniform emissions limit or
technology without regard to the varying circumstances of the regu-
lated ªrms. Accordingly, reliance on conventional standards would
mean forgoing the ºexibility beneªts of emissions trading.
One solution to this problem is to design tradable standards. How
would such standards work? A tradable standards program would use
estimates of the average life and use of a product to translate over-
compliance with a standard into a stream of emission allowances as-
signed to particular years, known as “vintaged” allowances.222 Con-
                                                                                                                     
219 See Ctr. for Clean Air Policy, supra note 95, at 5–6.
220 See U.S. EPA, supra note 2, at 1-20 tbl.1-14.
221 The approximately 20% of emissions uncovered by a sectoral hybrid program com-
prise sources that neither use electricity, and therefore are not reached by the cap on
power plants, nor are regulated by existing standards. These include sources in the trans-
portation sector, such as locomotives, freight trucks, certain commercial vehicles, aircraft,
ships and barges; the commercial buildings sector, such as natural gas-ªred heating and
cooling equipment; and the industrial sector, such as boilers and furnace heaters in indus-
trial sources not participating in the cap-and-trade program.
222 The reason to have vintaged allowances is to make clear when allowances may be
used for compliance. If a U.S. domestic program sets a series of discrete compliance peri-
ods into the future, policymakers might want to allow only certain vintages of allowances to
be used in certain periods. Absent such a restriction, the Corporate Average Carbon
Efªciency approach would allow ªrms to meet their emission reduction obligations in a
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versely, the program would translate a failure to achieve the standard
into an annualized deªcit of allowances. Box 5 provides a detailed de-
scription of how a tradable standards program for motor vehicles—
referred to as “Corporate Average Carbon Efªciency” (CACE) stan-
dard—could work.
Tradable standards would increase ºexibility and therefore re-
duce the cost for ªrms to comply with standards. Such an approach
could provide for at least three levels of trading: (1) intra-ªrm trad-
ing, in which a ªrm could achieve an average level of efªciency across
its product lines, instead of being required to meet the standard for
each product line; (2) trading among ªrms subject to standards; and
(3) trading between ªrms subject to standards and ªrms subject to
the cap-and-trade program.
As discussed in greater detail below, a potential drawback of a
tradable standards approach—and, indeed, any approach that relies on
standards—is that it does not ensure that emissions will be limited at
any particular level. An alternative approach that could address this
drawback is a capped tradable standards program.223 Under such an
approach, policymakers would set a cap on the total emissions associ-
ated with particular types of newly manufactured products. To sell
products subject to the capped standard, manufacturers would have to
obtain and surrender allowances. In other words, it would not be
sufªcient merely to produce products that met the standard; manufac-
turers would have to account for the projected emissions associated
with each product they sold. A capped tradable standards program
would entail resolving a number of design issues, including issues re-
lated to allowance allocation, shutdowns, new market entrants, changes
in manufacturer market share, and changes in overall level of output.
It is important to note that either tradable standards or capped
tradable standards could raise intra-industry competitiveness issues.
Firms with a wide range of product lines may be able to generate in-
ternal allowances from efªcient product lines that can be used to
“subsidize” inefªcient products in other product lines—arguably to
the competitive detriment of single product line manufacturers.224
                                                                                                                     
near-term compliance period with allowances representing emission reductions that will
not take place until many years later. See Winkelman et al., supra note 159, at 16.
223 For descriptions of capped tradable standards approaches, see id.; Heinz Ctr., su-
pra note 81, at app.5.
224 In addition, it is important to note that the efªciency gains of making standards
tradable do not always exceed the administrative costs. In some cases, it is equally, or even
more cost-effective to simply prescribe a particular uniform emissions limit, technology, or
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Box 5: Corporate Average Carbon Efªciency (CACE) Standard
Assume the vehicle efªciency standard were set at 30 mpg and
the automaker had sold one million cars with an average fuel econ-
omy of 27 mpg, and estimated annual vehicle miles traveled for each
car was 10,000 miles.225
Annual emissions at CACE level: [(1,000,000 cars) × (10,000 miles)]
÷   [(30 mpg) × (.01 tons CO2/gal)]
= 3,333,333 tons CO2
Actual annual emissions: [(1,000,000 cars) × (10,000 miles)]
÷   [(27 mpg) × (.01 tons CO2/gal)]
= 3,703,704 tons CO2
The automaker would have to buy 370,371 tons CO2-equivalent
of allowances each year to comply.
3. Integrating Tradable Standards with a Cap-and-Trade Program
Developing a domestic program that combines tradable stan-
dards with a cap-and-trade program raises an additional design issue.
If trading is allowed between ªrms subject to standards and ªrms sub-
ject to a cap, how will such trading be regulated so as to prevent dou-
ble-counting of reductions?
For example, if a ªrm that manufactured an electrical appliance,
such as a refrigerator, exceeded the efªciency standard for that prod-
uct, the resulting improvement in efªciency would reduce electricity
use, and therefore reduce emissions by electricity generators. If the
refrigerator manufacturer earned a tradable allowance for its over-
compliance and the resultant emissions reduction by the electric gen-
erator also created a surplus allowance, the same ton of CO2 reduc-
tions would generate two tons of allowances. To deal with this prob-
lem, manufacturers of electricity-consuming products that are subject
to standards could be precluded from trading outside their own sec-
tors. However, there would be no reason not to allow them to trade
between electric product lines and with other ªrms subject to electric
product efªciency standards.
                                                                                                                     
practice. See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efªcient?
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efªciency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Envi-
ronmental Protection, in 2001 Land Use & Env’t L. Rev. 509.
225 This example is adapted from Winkelman et al., supra note 159, at 22.
2005] Designing a Mandatory U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program 155
Double-counting would not be an issue for products that emit
CO2 directly, such as automobiles or gas appliances. Accordingly, a
hybrid program could permit manufacturers of such products to
trade freely into the cap-and-trade market.226
Box 6: Alternative Hybrid Options
While the focus of this section of the Article is on a program that
would combine product efªciency standards with a large-source,
downstream cap-and-trade program, it also would be possible to inte-
grate product efªciency standards with an upstream cap-and-trade
program.227 Two such options are described below:
Product Efªciency Standards that Supplement an Upstream Cap-and-
Trade Program: This hybrid would use product efªciency standards to
supplement a full upstream cap-and-trade program. It would layer stan-
dards on top of the upstream program, that is, ªrms subject to the up-
                                                                                                                     
226 Such trading, however, raises a separate issue. Some analysts argue that because
tradable standards do not affect an absolute cap on emissions from ªrms subject to those
standards, a hybrid program should not allow trading between ªrms subject to standards
and ªrms subject to a cap, even though it is not clear that such trading could result in any
increase in total emissions. See U.K. Dep’t of the Env’t, Transport & the Regions,
Draft Framework Document for the U.K. Emissions Trading Scheme 24–26 (2001),
available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/trading/uk/draft/pdf/
trading.pdf. The United Kingdom has established an emissions trading program in which
ªrms subject to a cap (referred to as an “absolute target”) may trade with ªrms subject to a
tradable standard (referred to as a “relative target.”) See id. at 22. However, the U.K. re-
quires such trades go through a mechanism called the “gateway.” See id. at 26–27. The
gateway tracks all allowance transfers and ensures that there is no net transfer of allow-
ances from the relative to the absolute sector. See id. In other words, a ªrm in the relative
sector may sell an excess allowance through the gateway to the absolute sector only when
the net ºow of allowances from the absolute sector into the relative sector is positive.
227 Sectoral hybrid programs that combine standards with an upstream, rather than
downstream, cap-and-trade program raise signiªcant coordination issues. The predicate of
such a program is that a fuel use is exempt from allowance requirements only if the prod-
uct in which the fuel is used is covered by a product standard. However, this predicate may
be unrealistic in practice because exclusions for particular types of fuel uses might not be
feasible to administer. Gasoline suppliers will be unable to distinguish between fuel pur-
chased for use in an automobile subject to fuel economy standards as opposed to a lawn
mower not subject to these standards. Similarly, natural gas distributors may not be able to
distinguish between gas used in a furnace subject to efªciency standards, and gas used at a
distributed generation unit that is not. Finally, any program in which some fuel distributed
is subject to an allowance requirement while other fuel is exempt, gives rise to risks of eva-
sion. When faced with these problems, designers of such a program are likely to have three
choices: (1) ªne-tune the deªnitions of excluded fuel uses so that any fuel use not subject
to standards is covered by the cap-and-trade program; (2) expand the standards program
to cover all exempt uses; or (3) ignore fuel use by products not subject to standards where
the use is not associated with signiªcant emissions.
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stream program still would be required to hold allowances for the car-
bon content of all fuel they distribute to downstream users, including
fuel they send for use in products subject to standards.228 Under this
approach, the upstream program would still be subject to an economy
wide cap; the standards would be there to help ensure that efªcient
products reach the market when consumers need them. Firms subject
to standards could trade with one another, but to avoid double-
counting, they could not trade into the cap-and-trade program.
Product Efªciency Standards that Complement an Upstream Cap-and-
Trade Program: Under this hybrid option, an upstream cap-and-trade
program would apply to all fuels except those used in products subject
to standards. Thus, if product efªciency standards applied to automo-
biles and consumer products that used home heating fuels, then gaso-
line, home heating oils, and residential gas would be exempt from up-
stream allowance requirements. A broader standards program—one
that included large trucks and commercial heating equipment—could
be linked to broader exclusions from the upstream cap-and-trade pro-
gram, thus allowing diesel fuel and fuel delivered for use in commercial
buildings to be outside the cap-and-trade program. A variant of this ap-
proach would set up a product efªciency standards program, a down-
stream cap-and-trade program for electricity generators and other large
stationary sources, and an upstream program applicable to fuel distrib-
uted for all uses other than automobile, residential, and commercial
use, and electricity generators. Designing this hybrid approach also
would require addressing double-counting risks.
4. Sectoral Hybrid Approach Issues
Even a well-designed sectoral hybrid program has some
signiªcant drawbacks compared to an economy-wide upstream cap-
and-trade program.
First, standards provide no incentive to adopt what, in many cases,
may be the lowest-cost abatement option: reduced use. As explained
below, the absence of any incentive to reduce use means that a stan-
dards approach—even if the standards are tradable—may be a
signiªcantly less cost-effective means of meeting any emissions limit
                                                                                                                     
228 As used here, the term consumers “subject to standards” encompasses consumers
directly subject to standards, such as electricity generators and consumers using products
that are subject to standards, such as motorists.
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compared to a cap-and-trade program that regulates fuel producers or
end-users directly.
In the transportation sector, for example, standards would force
lower-emitting vehicles into the marketplace, but they would not pro-
vide any incentive for motorists to drive less. Indeed, if gasoline prices
were to stay the same, motorists that purchased compliant vehicles
might increase their miles traveled because more fuel-efªcient vehi-
cles cost less to drive. This “rebound effect” could offset some of the
projected emission reductions.229 In addition, standards only apply to
new products, not existing products. Accordingly, the effectiveness of
standards in limiting emissions would depend on the rate at which
consumers replaced their old, unregulated products with the new,
regulated ones.230 Gauging this rate is complicated by the “junker ef-
fect”: subjecting products to standards may increase their price,
thereby encouraging consumers to hold onto their unregulated,
higher-emitting models.231
A third potential drawback of a standards approach is that it re-
lies heavily on estimates. For each standard, policymakers would have
to formulate various estimates of lifetime product use and associated
emissions, as well as rates of adoption. Even a capped tradable stan-
dards program would cap only projected, not actual, lifetime emis-
sions associated with covered products. The heavy reliance on esti-
mates means that a hybrid program would offer substantially less
certainty about meeting emission reduction goals than a cap-and-
trade program.
Fourth, a hybrid program also would be more difªcult to admin-
ister over time than an upstream cap-and-trade program. With an up-
stream cap-and-trade program in place, gradually phasing in more
ambitious national emission targets would involve little more than
gradually ratcheting down the economy-wide cap. Achieving the same
result with a hybrid program, on the other hand, would involve con-
tinuously promulgating adjustments to multiple standards for multi-
ple sectors.
                                                                                                                     
229 Some studies suggest that a 10% increase in fuel efªciency for automobiles likely
would result in a 1% to 2% increase in vehicle miles traveled. See Transp. Research Bd.,
supra note 59, at 19.
230 Winkelman et al. discuss an approach in which responsibility for emissions from the
on-road ºeet of vehicles would be distributed among automakers, but note several short-
comings of such an approach. Winkelman et al., supra note 159, at 14–16.
231 Id. at 15. The “junker effect” also is sometimes referred to as “new source bias.”
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To date, none of the economic studies has modeled a sectoral hy-
brid with tradable standards. However, analysis of hybrid programs
without the trading feature indicates that these programs entail
signiªcantly greater cost when compared with an upstream cap-and-
trade program. It is possible that a sectoral hybrid program could be
substantially less cost-effective, as well as more administratively burden-
some, than an economy-wide upstream cap-and-trade or tax pro-
gram.232
5. Evaluation of Sectoral Hybrid Approach
Environmental Effectiveness: A sectoral hybrid would have higher
environmental effectiveness than a downstream program alone, be-
cause standards could address emissions from sources that could not
be covered by a downstream cap-and-trade program. On the other
hand, it would be less effective than an economy-wide upstream cap-
and-trade program because standards would not address the intensity
of product use or the replacement rate of new products for old. In
addition, not all sources that fall outside a large-source cap-and-trade
program could be regulated through standards.
Cost-Effectiveness: A sectoral hybrid program would be a more
costly means of achieving any particular emissions target than an
economy-wide upstream cap-and-trade program. The ultimate cost of
the sectoral hybrid option also would depend on, among other things,
whether the standards were tradable standards.
Administrative Feasibility: It would be relatively straight-forward to
modify existing efªciency standards for purposes of a sectoral hybrid
program. However, transforming such conventional standards into
tradable standards would present some new complexities. Capped
tradable standards present signiªcant design issues. In addition, hy-
brid programs are signiªcantly more complex administratively than
are any of their individual elements because of the need for coordina-
tion. Trading would need to be carefully regulated to prevent double-
counting of emission reductions and evasion of allowance require-
ments. In addition, promulgating new standards to cover products
and practices not now subject to standards also would be an adminis-
trative burden.
                                                                                                                     
232 The Congressional Budget Ofªce arrived at this conclusion in a 2002 study assess-
ing options for reducing gasoline consumption. See CBO, Reducing Gasoline Consump-
tion, supra note 169.
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Distributional Equity: A sectoral hybrid program could exclude
households from the direct burden of regulation under the cap-and-
trade program. However, such an approach would increase electricity
prices and would put additional burdens on the manufacturing sector.
These burdens would be felt indirectly by households in the form of
higher product prices. The ultimate distribution of impacts from a sec-
toral hybrid program also would depend on how policymakers opted to
distribute allowances, or the revenues from an allowance auction.
Political Acceptability: Hybrid programs offer policymakers options
for addressing domestic GHG emissions while avoiding gasoline and
home heating fuel price increases. In particular, a sectoral hybrid
program would offer a means of largely avoiding these price in-
creases—but not electric rate increases—albeit at some cost to envi-
ronmental effectiveness. Also, the familiarity of the standards compo-
nent may enhance its acceptability.
Conclusion
Policymakers in the United States face a plethora of choices for
the design of a domestic GHG regulatory program—upstream or
downstream cap-and-trade, GHG tax, product standards, and hybrid
programs—as well as the myriad details of program design that must
be addressed once the overall approach is chosen.
Using the criteria spelled out in Section IV, we evaluated the
principal design options. The results of that evaluation are summa-
rized below.
A. Cap-and-Trade Programs
1. All-Source Downstream Cap-and-Trade
An economy-wide downstream cap-and-trade program—because it
implies the regulation of millions of individual GHG sources, including
cars and homes—would be difªcult and costly to administer. It would
not be a viable prospect for a domestic GHG regulatory program.
2. Upstream Cap-and-Trade
An economy-wide upstream cap-and-trade program would be en-
vironmentally effective, could attain least-cost compliance if it incor-
porates ºexibility measures, and would be administratively feasible. Its
distributional consequences would depend on how allowances were
allocated and, if auctioned, how the auction revenues were recycled
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back into the economy. These allocation and revenue recycling deci-
sions would inºuence overall compliance costs. Some methods of al-
locating allowances, such as generation performance standards, can
be less economically efªcient than others, and can be less efªcient
than an auction. According to some economists, using auction reve-
nues to reduce distortionary taxes could partially offset the costs of
the program. Finally, because an economy-wide upstream cap-and-
trade program would drive up the cost of gasoline and home heating
fuels, it is likely to present a political challenge.
Thus, if policymakers were willing to accept a program that re-
sults in visible increases in gasoline and home heating fuel prices, one
environmentally effective, efªcient, and feasible option would be a
comprehensive upstream cap-and-trade program. Such a program
could be coupled with limited free distribution of allowances to com-
pensate affected business, auction of the remaining allowances, and
the use of auction revenues for tax reductions and other ends.
There are substantial theoretical beneªts from such an approach.
The near-term environmental outcome is clear, assuming that the gov-
ernment will maintain the emission limits in the face of possibly
signiªcant price uncertainty and volatility. Current analysis indicates
that it would minimize economic costs to the economy, be manageable
administratively, avoid over-compensating existing emitters, and per-
haps capture some offsetting beneªts from reduction of distortionary
taxes.
Nevertheless, an economy-wide upstream cap-and-trade program
raises a number of issues. First, critics may characterize it as a large,
ambitious, and untried experiment in regulation, and may question
how it will work in practice. Second, auction revenues may be difªcult
to predict, making it difªcult to answer the question of whether, and
when, Congress will enact such a system. Even in times of most com-
pelling national circumstances, such as the 1973 Arab oil embargo,
Congress has not been willing to allow fuel prices to increase
sufªciently to bring demand in balance with supply.233 On the other
hand, adopting an upstream cap-and-trade program does not inevita-
bly mean accepting a signiªcant and immediate hike in consumer
fuel prices. The price impacts could be limited to only a few cents per
gallon if the program began with a moderate emissions target and
                                                                                                                     
233 Congress’s response to the Arab oil embargo was to impose price controls rather
than let prices rise to world market levels. See supra note 116.
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then phased in a more stringent target gradually over time, or if it in-
corporated use of a safety valve.
A workable variant of the upstream cap-and-trade program de-
scribed above is an upstream/downstream design that combines a
downstream cap-and-trade program for electricity generators and
other large sources with an upstream cap-and-trade program for other
major sectors of the economy. The McCain-Lieberman bill reºects
this approach.
3. Large-Source Downstream Cap-and-Trade
A large-source downstream cap-and-trade program—one appli-
cable to electricity generators and large industrial sources of CO2 and
of certain other greenhouse gases—is administratively feasible and
could be environmentally effective with respect to the sectors it cov-
ered. To be fully effective, however, such an approach would have to
be coupled with a program to cover other sectors. A large-source
downstream program might be more politically acceptable than an
upstream economy-wide program because it would not result in price
increases for gasoline and home heating fuels, though it still would
result in price increases for electricity.
B. GHG Tax
An upstream GHG tax program would allow for adoption of least-
cost mitigation strategies, offer short-term cost certainty, and be ad-
ministratively feasible. A tax program would not provide certainty in
meeting a particular short-term emissions target. However, because it
is cumulative rather than annual emissions that are important, taxes
should be able to provide almost equivalent long-term environmental
certainty if there is political will to adjust them over time. The ulti-
mate distributional consequences of a GHG tax would depend on
how policymakers distributed revenues from the tax. However, politi-
cal acceptability is likely to be a major obstacle since a GHG tax com-
bines both new taxes and fuel price increases. A GHG tax may be
more politically attractive as part of a larger tax reform program.
C. Sectoral Hybrid Program
A sectoral hybrid program such as the one outlined in Box 4
would consist of a large-source downstream program coupled with
product efªciency standards. Such a program would be more envi-
ronmentally effective than either a downstream program or standards
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alone, because standards could address emissions from sources—such
as automobiles and appliances—that could not feasibly be covered by
the downstream cap-and-trade program. Relying on existing standards
programs, the ªrst phase of such a program could attain coverage of
about eighty percent of U.S. energy-related CO2 emissions. A second
phase of the program could address the remaining twenty percent
through an upstream cap-and-trade program or through expanded
product efªciency standards; the program could cover emissions of
other greenhouse gases through other measures.
A sectoral hybrid program has the advantage of building on exist-
ing regulation, and in the case of CAFE and appliance standards, po-
tentially improving on it by permitting manufacturers to trade among
product lines, with each other, and with other sectors. It would avoid
the politically difªcult step of attaching a carbon cost to the price of
gasoline and home heating. The tradable standard feature would cap-
ture some, but not all of the beneªts of a full cap-and-trade system.
However, these largely political attractions of the hybrid program
could come at some cost. Substituting product efªciency standards for
the transportation fuel component of an upstream cap-and-trade pro-
gram may downgrade the cost-effectiveness of such a program. Even
with a trading feature that tries to equate marginal control costs
among sectors, a product efªciency standards program lacks incen-
tives to discourage product end-use. Indeed, it might actually encour-
age greater use—the rebound effect, or encourage consumers to re-
place their existing inefªcient products for the more efªcient new
ones—the junker effect. The absence of such incentives is likely to
make a domestic program that relies on product efªciency standards
as an alternative to upstream regulation a more expensive approach
to meeting any GHG reduction target. In addition, incorporating
tradable standards would present signiªcant administrative challenges
because of the need to prevent double-counting of emission reduc-
tions and to deal with potential compliance evasion. Finally, any hy-
brid program is likely to give some beneªciaries of the program a
vested interest in retaining it, signiªcantly increasing the difªculty of
ultimately converting the hybrid program into a simpler, more
efªcient economy-wide upstream cap-and-trade program.
In sum, the analysis suggests that an economy-wide downstream
cap-and-trade program is difªcult to administer, that a stand-alone,
large-source cap-and-trade program is incomplete in coverage, and that
a GHG tax that is not part of a larger tax reform initiative is unviable
politically. The analysis does suggest that the comprehensive, upstream
cap-and-trade approach and the sectoral hybrid approach are the most
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viable alternatives for a domestic GHG reduction program. While an
economy-wide cap-and-trade approach may present the best option for
low-cost reductions in greenhouse gases, there are a set of existing sec-
tor-based approaches that could be built upon to address greenhouse
gases, such as the acid rain program for electricity generators, appli-
ance efªciency standards, and motor vehicle fuel economy standards.
For a variety of institutional, practical, and political reasons, a U.S. do-
mestic emissions reduction program may evolve in this direction. If
policymakers decide on that course, then careful attention will have to
be given to minimizing the economic costs and administrative com-
plexity, and assuring that the program can be effectively enforced.
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